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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON FRICTIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS
Junyuan Zou
Itay Goldstein

Guillermo L. Ordoñez

This thesis uses theoretical approach to study various types of frictions in financial markets. In the first chapter, “Information Acquisition and Liquidity Traps in OTC Markets,”
I analyze the interaction between buyers’ information acquisition and market liquidity in
over-the-counter markets with adverse selection. If a buyer anticipates that future buyers
will acquire information about asset quality, she has an incentive to acquire information
to avoid buying a lemon that will be hard to sell later. However, when current buyers
acquire information, they cream-skim the market, leaving a larger fraction of lemons for
sale and giving future buyers an incentive to acquire information. A liquid market can go
through a self-fulfilling market freeze when buyers start to acquire information. More importantly, if information acquisition continues for a long enough period of time, the market
gets stuck in an information trap with low liquidity: information acquisition worsens the
composition of assets remaining on the market, and the bad composition incentivizes information acquisition. This prediction helps explain why the market for non-agency residential
mortgage-backed securities experienced a sudden drop in liquidity–as potential buyers realized the need for greater due diligence–but has remained essentially dormant despite a
strong recovery in the housing market.
In the second chapter, “Intervention with Screening in Global Games,” my coauthor Lin
Shen and I propose a novel intervention program to reduce coordination failure. Compared
with the conventional government-guarantee type of programs, such as demand deposit
insurance, it incurs a lower cost of implementation and suffers less from moral hazard problems. The proposed program effectively screens agents based on their heterogeneous beliefs
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of the coordination results. In equilibrium, only a small mass of “pivotal agents” self-select
to participate in the program. However, the effect is amplified by strategic complementarities, and coordination failure can be significantly reduced. We demonstrate the generality of
the proposed program with applications in panic-based bank runs, debt rollover problems,
self-fulfilling market freezes, and underinvestment problems in the real economy.
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CHAPTER 1 : Information Acquisition and Liquidity Traps in OTC Markets
Junyuan Zou1

1.1. Introduction
During the 2007–2008 financial crisis, many asset markets suffered from periods of illiquidity—
sellers found it increasingly hard to sell assets at acceptable prices. Dry-ups in liquidity are
especially prominent among classes of assets that are opaque and traded in over-the-counter
(OTC) markets, as in the case with mortgage-backed securities (Gorton, 2009) and collateralized debt obligations (Brunnermeier, 2009). A large literature has sought to explain
these events of market freezes through the lens of asymmetric information.2 The standard
narrative is that asset owners are better informed of their assets’ quality than potential
buyers in these markets. Therefore, when the perceived average quality of assets decreases,
markets freeze as a result of the exacerbated adverse selection problem.
One decade after the financial crisis, the US economy is on track for the longest expansion
ever, and housing prices are on a path of continued growth.3 However, the impact of
the crisis seems rather persistent. The market for non-agency residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS), which was at the center of the financial crisis, has yet to come back
(Ospina and Uhlig, 2018).4 At the same time, investors have been conducting more due
diligence in inspecting and evaluating securitized products since the crisis. Instead of solely
relying on external ratings, investors now develop their own models to provide independent
1

I am deeply indebted to my committee members: Itay Goldstein, Guillermo Ordonez, Benjamin Lester,
Vincent Glode and Harold Cole for their guidance and support. I also thank Mitchell Berlin, Guillermo
Calvo, Alessandro Dovis, Ricardo Lagos, Christian Opp, Victor Rios-Rull, Chaojun Wang, Pierre-Olivier
Weill, Shengxing Zhang, as well as seminar participants in the Wharton Finance Seminars, the Macro
Seminars at Penn and the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia for useful comments. All errors are my
own.
2
See Tirole (2012), Daley and Green (2012), Camargo and Lester (2014), Guerrieri and Shimer (2014)
and Chiu and Koeppl (2016), among many other papers.
3
See All-Transactions House Price Index for the United States, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/
USSTHPI.
4
Non-agency mortgage-backed securities are issued by private entities, and do not carry an explicit or
implicit guarantee by the US government. In contrast, agency MBS are issued and backed by government
agencies or government-sponsored enterprises, such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae.
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assessments of asset quality.5 These stark differences in market liquidity and the behavior of
market participants before and after the crisis, despite similar fundamentals of the market,
are hard to reconcile with the standard narrative of adverse selection. Indeed, if the RMBS
market freeze was driven by deterioration of the value of the underlying mortgages, the
market should have recovered given the current strong economic fundamentals and the
bullish housing market.
To explain both the decline in market liquidity and the increase in investors’ due diligence,
I introduce buyers’ information acquisition into a dynamic adverse-selection model with
resale considerations. The key result of my model is that an asset market can have multiple
steady states, and more importantly, transitions between steady states are asymmetric.
Liquid markets are susceptible to a self-fulfilling market freeze, in which buyers suddenly
start to acquire information and the market quickly transitions from a liquid state to an
illiquid one. As illiquid trading and information acquisition continue for an extended period,
the market falls into an information trap with low liquidity and information acquisition, in
which there is no equilibrium path that leads back to the liquid state. Importantly, while
some previous papers have studied sudden market freezes in the framework of multiple
equilibria, my findings are different in terms of the sharp prediction of whether the market
can recover in a self-fulfilling manner after a market freeze.
Before describing these results in greater detail, it makes sense to first lay out the key
ingredients of the model. A continuum of investors trades assets of either high or low
quality. Gains from trade arise because asset owners are subject to idiosyncratic liquidity
shocks that lower the flow payoff from holding assets. Upon receiving a liquidity shock,
an asset owner participates in the market as a seller and trades with potential buyers who
arrive sequentially. A seller is privately informed of the quality of her own asset, while the
5

For instance, see The Economist in its January 11, 2014, issue: “Before 2008, . . . , investors piled in with
no due diligence to speak of. Aware of the reputational risks of messing up again, they now spend more time
dissecting three-letter assets than just about anything else in their portfolio.” Also, Kaal (2016) finds that
since the financial crisis, private funds have hired more analysts to conduct investors’ due diligence using
textual analysis of the ADV II filings.
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buyer can acquire a noisy signal of the asset’s quality by incurring a fixed cost. If the asset
is traded, the buyer hold the asset and will return to the market as a seller when receiving a
liquidity shock in the future. Otherwise, the seller keeps the asset and waits for the arrival
of the next buyer. Although this paper is motived by observations in the non-agency RMBS
market, the model can be applied to various OTC markets with asymmetric information.
How does buyers’ information acquisition interact with market liquidity? If the current
composition of assets for sale is good enough to support pooling trading, buyers’ information acquisition reduces current market liquidity. Intuitively, if a buyer acquires information
and observes a bad signal, she is unwilling to trade at a pooling price because the posterior
belief about the asset’s quality becomes worse. In addition to the static relationship between buyers’ information acquisition and market liquidity, there is also a dynamic strategic
complementarity between buyers’ current and future incentives to acquire information, and
hence a complementarity between current and future market liquidity. On one hand, current
buyers’ incentive to acquire information depends on future buyers’ information acquisition
through the resale consideration. If a buyer anticipates that future buyers will acquire information about asset quality, she has an incentive to acquire information so as to avoid buying
a low-quality asset that will be hard to sell at a later date. In this sense, expected future
market liquidity improves current market liquidity. On the other hand, current buyers’ information acquisition changes future buyers’ incentives to acquire information through the
cream-skimming effect. When current buyers acquire information, high-quality assets are
traded faster than low-quality assets. As low-quality assets accumulate on the market over
time, future buyers have more incentive to acquire information. Therefore, current market
illiquidity harms future market liquidity.
The dynamic strategic complementarity in buyers’ information acquisition gives rise to the
possibility of a self-fulfilling market freeze. Suppose the market is in a liquid state, in which
buyers do not acquire information and the composition of assets for sale is good. One
day, investors suddenly start to worry that in the future buyers will acquire information,

3

lowering market liquidity . As a result, the resale value of low-quality assets drops abruptly
and the current buyers start to acquire information. Because of the cream-skimming effect
of information acquisition, the composition of assets for sale deteriorates gradually, giving
future buyers more incentive to acquire information. This justifies current investors’ belief
in future low liquidity. A self-fulfilling market freeze takes place when investors coordinate
to follow an equilibrium path with information acquisition.
As the self-fulfilling market freeze continues and the composition of assets for sale declines
further, it is impossible for the market to return to liquid trading without outside intervention. This dynamic is apparent if we note that buyers’ incentives to acquire information
depend on both future market liquidity and the current composition of assets for sale. When
the composition is bad enough, even if buyers believe the market will be liquid in the future,
it is still optimal for them to acquire information today to avoid buying low-quality assets.
Their information acquisition in turn keeps the composition of assets for sale at a low level.
The market is therefore “trapped” in an illiquid state with information acquisition and
longer trading delays.
The key mechanism that generates the asymmetric transitions between states with different
liquidity is the slow-moving property of the composition of assets for sale. Buyers’ information acquisition worsens the composition of assets for sale through the cream-skimming
effect and has a long-lasting negative impact on future market liquidity. The composition
will only improve gradually when buyers stop acquiring information. However, even with
the most optimistic belief about future market liquidity, buyers will not stop acquiring information unless the composition of assets is good enough. Buyers’ information acquisition
and the bad composition of assets for sale reinforce each other, preventing the market from
recovering without outside intervention to clean the market.
This paper sheds light on the discussion of regulatory reforms to increase transparency in
many asset markets. For example, Dodd-Frank Act Section 942 requires issuers of assetbacked securities (ABS) to provide asset-level information according to specified standards.

4

These measures increase the precision of buyers’ idiosyncratic signals when they conduct
due diligence. Although these measures can potentially discipline the ABS issuance process,
I show that they have the unintended consequence of increasing fragility in the secondary
market. When buyers have access to more precise signals, they have a greater incentive to
acquire information and provide quotes conditional on the signals. Therefore the creamskimming effect becomes stronger and the market is more susceptible to an information
trap.
This paper also has important implications for the timing of the provision of asset purchase
programs aiming to revive the market. During the latest financial crisis, the US Treasury
created the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), aimed at restoring a liquid market
by purchasing “toxic” assets. I show that the fraction of “toxic” assets on the market is
endogenous and depends on investors’ information acquisition in the past. As the market
gets deeper into a crisis, the asset composition on the market becomes worse and policy
makers need to purchase a larger amount of low-quality assets to revive the market.
The paper is organized as follows. I describe the model setup in Section 1.2. Section 1.3
focuses on the equilibrium analysis. The stationary equilibria are studied in Section 1.4. In
Section 1.5 I explore the set of non-stationary equilibria that converge to different steady
states. Policy implications are studied in Section 1.6. Section 1.7 concludes.
Related Literature
This paper builds on the large literature on adverse selection initiated by the seminal work
of Akerlof (1970). Among many other papers, Janssen and Roy (2002); Camargo and
Lester (2014); Chari et al. (2014), and Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2015) analyze dynamic-adverse
selection models with centralized or decentralized market structures.6 These models share
the common feature that low-quality assets are sold faster than or at the same speed as
high-quality assets. None of these papers feature resale considerations or buyers’ acquisition
of information about assets’ quality.
6

See also Hendel and Lizzeri (1999), Blouin (2003), Hörner and Vieille (2009), Moreno and Wooders
(2010).
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Taylor (1999), Zhu (2012), Lauermann and Wolinsky (2016), and Kaya and Kim (2018)
all considers dynamic adverse-selection models in which each buyer observes a noisy signal about an asset’s quality. A new result obtained in this strand of literature is that
high-quality assets are traded faster than low-quality assets. This is related to the creamskimming effect in my model when buyers acquire information. These papers consider a
trading environment with a single seller and sequentially arriving buyers, and there is no
scope for reselling the asset. In contrast, in my paper, buyers anticipate that they will sell
their assets in the same market when they experience liquidity shocks.
In papers that study dynamic adverse-selection models with resale considerations—such as
Chiu and Koeppl (2016) and Asriyan et al. (2018)—buyers’ valuation of an asset depends on
future market liquidity. This gives rise to an intertemporal coordination problem which in
turn yields multiple steady states with symmetric self-fulfilling transitions. Another closely
related study is by Hellwig and Zhang (2012), who analyze a dynamic adverse-selection
model with both resale consideration and endogenous information acquisition. While I
allow buyers’ signals to be noisy, they focus on the situations in which the signals are
precise. Therefore, information acquisition has no cream-skimming effect in their model and
transitions between steady states are symmetric. In contrast to all of the above papers, mine
has the novel feature of generating multiple steady states with unidirectional transitions.
This paper is also related to work by Daley and Green (2012, 2016), who study the role of
a publicly observable “news” process in dynamic-adverse selection models. In my paper,
buyers make their own decisions on whether to acquire information and the information is
not observable to other market participants.
In terms of modeling search frictions, this paper builds on the theoretical papers on OTC
markets. Examples are Duffie et al. (2005, 2007); Vayanos and Weill (2008); and Lagos and
Rocheteau (2009). The trading environment is very similar to the investor’s life-cycle model
in Vayanos and Wang (2007). I contribute to this literature by introducing asymmetric
information about asset quality.
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There is a large literature that studies information acquisition in financial markets, including
Froot et al. (1992); Glode et al. (2012); Fishman and Parker (2015); as well as Bolton et al.
(2016).7 This literature shows that information acquisition can be a strategic complement
and excess information acquisition in equilibrium leads to inefficiency. I differ from this line
of research by studying information acquisition in a dynamic trading environment. This
allows me to characterize transitions between different states of the market, such as episodes
of market freezes or recovery. Also, I consider an opaque trading environment in which
trading history is not directly observable to other market participants. This differentiates
my paper to the literature that features positive spillover effect of information acquisition.8
Lastly, this paper contributes to the literature on the role of transparency and information
acquisition in financial crises. Gorton and Ordonez (2014) study how a small shock to the
collateral value can be amplified into a large financial crisis when it triggers information
acquisition. In my model, a market freeze can arise as a self-fulfilling outcome. Also, I study
a topic not addressed in their paper: whether a market can recover after a crisis. In terms
of policy implications, this paper is related to the recent discussion of optimal disclosure
of information by government and regulators, as in Alvarez and Barlevy (2015); Bouvard
et al. (2015); Gorton and Ordonez (2017); and Goldstein and Leitner (2018). A closely
related study is that of Pagano and Volpin (2012), who also look at the welfare implications
of increasing transparency in the securitization process. My work differs from the literature
in that I argue that information disclosure does not directly reveal the value of an asset;
instead, investors need to conduct due diligence to interpret the disclosed information. The
noise in the interpretation of disclosed information reflects the complexity of the underlying
assets, such as securitized products. Greater transparency reduces noise, but it can also
exacerbate adverse selection in the market through the cream-skimming effect.
7
See also Barlevy and Veronesi (2000), Veldkamp (2006), Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009), Goldstein and
Yang (2015).
8
See Camargo et al. (2015) for an example.
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1.2. The Model
Time is continuous and infinite. There is a continuum of assets with mass 1. The quality
of an asset is either high or low, denoted by j ∈ {H, L}. The mass of high-quality and lowquality assets is fixed at α/(1 + α) and 1/(1 + α) respectively, so the ratio of high-quality to
low-quality assets is α, which is an exogenous parameter that controls the average quality
of the assets. Therefore I will refer to α as the fundamental of the market.9
The trading environment is populated with a continuum of investors. They are risk-neutral
and discount time at rate r . Each of them is restricted to holding either 0 units or 1 unit of
an asset. Their preference for holding assets can be either unshocked or shocked, reflecting
the fact that some investors experience liquidity shocks and become financially constrained.
Whether an investor is shocked is observable or verifiable. When holding an asset of quality
j ∈ {H, L}, an unshocked investor enjoys a flow payoff designated as rvj , while a shocked
investor enjoys a flow payoff of rcj . Throughout this paper, I maintain the assumption that
vH > cH > vL ≥ cL > 0. Thus, the shocked investors enjoy a lower flow payoff from holding
both types of assets. Also, cH > vL , meaning that the common value component dominates
the private value component, which is a necessary condition for the existence of the lemons
problem.
Following Vayanos and Wang (2007), I consider a life-cycle model of OTC markets. At any
time, there is a flow into the economy of unshocked investors without assets, the buyers in
the market. They have a one-time opportunity to trade with the shocked asset owners, who
are the sellers in the market. After buying an asset, a buyer becomes an unshocked asset
owner. Otherwise, if trade is unsuccessful, the buyer exits the market with zero payoff.
Since an investor’s liquidity shock is observable, there will be no trade between a buyer and
an unshocked asset owner.10 Therefore, unshocked asset owners only passively hold assets
9

I deviate from the conventional notation of using the fraction of high-quality assets to represent the
average quality of the assets. The notation adopted here turns out to be convenient for characterizing
investors’ beliefs and asset distribution.
10
This is a direct implication of the No-Trade Theorem in Milgrom and Stokey (1982).
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until their preferences change. These investors are labeled as holders. Holders face liquidity
shocks that arrive at Poisson rate δ. Upon receiving a liquidity shock, a holder becomes a
seller and offers her asset for sale on the market. For simplicity, I assume that the inflow
of buyers at any time equals a constant λ times the mass of sellers in the market. These
buyers are matched with sellers randomly. Therefore, from a seller’s perspective, buyers
arrive at a constant Poisson rate λ. Sellers stay in the market until they sell the assets and
exit the economy with zero payoff.
The flow of investors in the economy is summarized in Figure 1. Buyers enter the economy
from the pool of outsider investors. When a seller sells an asset, she exits the economy and
returns to the pool of outside investors. I use the word market to represent the two groups
of active traders in the economy, the sellers and the buyers. From a buyer’s perspective, the
severity of the adverse selection problem is determined by the composition of sellers with
high-quality and low-quality assets. Notice that sellers are a subset of asset owners who
actively participate in the market. Therefore, the composition of assets among sellers can
potentially differ from the fundamental of the market, which is the asset composition among
all asset owners. In this sense, the level of adverse selection in my model is endogenous and
depends on the asset distribution. Later, I use the word market composition to represent
the composition of high-quality and low-quality assets among sellers.

Market
Entry

Trade
Buyers

Outside
investors

Unsuccessful
trade, Exit

Holders
Sellers

Trade and Exit

Liquidity Shock

Figure 1: Flow Diagram of the Asset Market
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When a buyer meets a seller, the seller is privately informed of the quality of her asset.
The buyer does not observe the quality of the seller’s asset, nor does she have information
regarding the trading history of the seller. Her prior belief is determined by the market
composition—i.e., the ratio of high-quality assets and low-quality assets among sellers. In
addition, the buyer can pay a fixed cost k to acquire information and obtain a signal
ψ ∈ {G , B} of the asset’s quality. G represents a good signal and B represents a bad signal.
The probability of observing a signal ψ from an asset of quality j is fjψ . Signals obtained
by different buyers are jointly independent conditional on the quality of the asset. The
assumption that a buyer can only observe a noisy signal of the asset’s quality captures the
opaque nature of the assets. Different buyers may have different evaluations of the same
asset. Without loss of generality, I assume fHG > fLG , so a high-quality asset is more likely to
generate a good signal than a low-quality asset. This implies that a good signal improves
the buyer’s posterior belief about the asset’s quality. The trading protocol is deliberately
simple. The buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller. The entire transaction
takes place instantly, with the seller and buyer separating immediately afterward.

1.3. Equilibrium Analysis
In this section I analyze investors’ optimal trading strategies and define the equilibrium of
the model. Since investors are infinitesimal, they take the continuation value of leaving a
match as given. This allows me to separate the equilibrium analysis into three parts. First,
I study a static trading game between a seller and a buyer, taking the continuation values as
given. Second, I determine the continuation values of different agents. Lastly, I characterize
the evolution of the asset distribution.
1.3.1. The Static Trading Game
The static trading game is played by one seller and one buyer. To define a static trading
game, it is sufficient to specify the prior belief of the buyer and the terminal payoffs of
both players when they separate. I denote the buyer’s prior belief by θ(t), which equals
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the probability that the seller carries a high-quality asset divided by the probability that
the seller carries a low-quality asset. If θ is small, there is a large fraction of low-quality
assets on the market, and the adverse selection problem is severe. In equilibrium, θ must
be consistent with the asset distribution among sellers when the buyer meets the seller. If
the seller sells the asset or the buyer does not buy the asset, they leave the economy with
zero continuation value. If the buyer buys an asset of quality j ∈ {H, L}, the continuation
value is denoted by Vj (t), which is also the continuation value of a passive holder at time
t. If the seller keeps an asset of quality j, the continuation value is denoted by Cj (t). From
now on, I omit the time argument of all variables when analyzing the static trading game.
A static trading game is therefore defined by the combination of the buyer’s prior belief
and the continuation values (θ; VH , CH , VL , CL ). For reasons that will become clear later, we
only need to consider the case of VH > CH > VL , CL .
The static game has two stages, the information acquisition stage and the trading stage.
We use backward induction to solve the static game. The seller’s optimal strategy takes a
simple form. A seller with an asset of quality j is going to accept any price higher than the
continuation value Cj and reject any offer below Cj . The buyer needs to decide whether to
acquire information, and based on her belief about the asset’s value after the information
acquisition stage, decides upon an optimal offering price. If the buyer acquires information,
she will update her belief in a Bayesian way. Her posterior belief about the asset’s quality
after seeing signal ψ ∈ {G , B} in the form of a high-quality to low-quality ratio is

θ̃(θ, ψ) =

fHψ
fLψ

θ.

(1.1)

If the buyer doesn’t acquire information, the posterior belief θ̃ equals the prior belief θ. For
the consistency of notation, let θ̃(θ, N) = θ represent the posterior belief if the buyer has
chosen not to acquire information.
The following lemma characterized the optimal offering strategy of the buyer conditional
on the posterior belief θ̃(θ, ψ).
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Lemma 1.1. The buyer’s strategy is characterized by a threshold belief

θ̂ =

CH − min {CL , VL }
.
VH − CH

1. If θ̃(θ, ψ) > θ̂, the buyer makes a pooling offer CH ,
2. If θ̃(θ, ψ) < θ̂ and VL > CL , the buyer makes a separating offer CL ,
3. If θ̃(θ, ψ) < θ̂ and VL < CL , the buyer makes a no-trade offer p < CL .
If the buyer’s posterior belief θ̃(θ, ψ) is above the threshold θ̂, the buyer should offer a
pooling price CH to trade with both the high-quality and the low-quality seller. However,
if the buyer’s posterior belief is not good enough, the optimal price to offer depends on the
relationship between VL and CL or, alternatively, whether there are gains from trade of a
low-quality asset. If VL > CL , the buyer values a low-quality asset more than the seller
does, and the buyer can offer a separating price CL that will only be accepted by a low-type
seller. On the other hand, if VL < CL , the buyer values a low-quality asset less than the
seller does, and it is optimal for the buyer to offer a no-trade price, which is lower than
a low-type seller’s continuation value, to avoid buying the asset. In the knife-edge case of
θ̃(θ, ψ) = θ̂, or VL = CL , the optimal offering strategy of the buyer can be a mixed strategy.
In the information acquisition stage, the buyer will compare the value of information, which
is the increase in the expected payoff after the buyer observes the signal, to the cost of
information acquisition. She will only acquire information about the asset when the net
gain is positive. The signal is potentially valuable to the buyer because it gives the buyer
the option of making offers conditional on the signal. Depending on prior belief, the buyer
will either improve the offered price when seeing a good signal, or lower the offered price
when seeing a bad signal.
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Lemma 1.2. The value of information is

W (θ) =


n

 max − θ f B (VH − CH ) +
1+θ H

 max{ θ f G (VH − CH ) −
1+θ H

1
B
1+θ fL (CH

1
G
1+θ fL (CH

o
− min {CL , VL }), 0 ,

− min {CL , VL }), 0},

if θ ≥ θ̂,
if θ < θ̂.
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Figure 2: Value of information to the buyer.
Figure 2 depicts the value of information as a function of the prior belief θ. Let Wmax be
the maximum value of information. If the prior belief θ falls at the left or right end of
the [0, 1] interval, the value of information is zero. This is because the prior belief is so
high (low) that even after observing a bad (good) signal, the posterior is still higher (lower)
than the threshold belief. If the prior belief is around the threshold belief θ̂, the value of
information first increases from 0, reaches the maximum at θ̂, and then decreases to 0. The
buyer will acquire information if and only if the value of information based on the prior
belief is greater than the cost of acquiring information. The following lemma summarizes
the buyer’s optimal strategy in information acquisition.
Lemma 1.3. If k < Wmax , the buyer will acquire information if and only if
θ− (k, min {CL , VL }) ≤ θ ≤ θ+ (k, min {CL , VL }),
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where the two functions are defined as
θ− (k, ν) =

fLG (CH − ν) + k
,
fHG (VH − CH ) − k

θ+ (k, ν) =

fLB (CH − ν) − k
.
fHB (VH − CH ) + k

Both θ− (k, ν) and θ+ (k, ν) are decreasing in ν.
When the value of a low-quality asset (min {CL , VL }) decreases, the loss of buying a lowquality asset at pooling price CH is higher. Therefore, the buyer is more inclined to avoid
low-quality assets on the right boundary of the information-sensitive region and less willing to rely on the noisy signal on the left boundary. The information-sensitive region
[θ− (k), θ+ (k)] moves to the right as both CL and VL decrease. As we will show later, CL and
VL are determined by both the flow payoff from holding the asset and the likelihood that
a low-quality asset can be sold at the pooling price in the future. The above comparative
statics are important because they are related to the resale consideration that links the current buyers’ information acquisition decision to future market liquidity. When the current
market composition is relatively good (θ on the right boundary of the information-sensitive
region), buyers are more willing to acquire information if their belief about future market
liquidity deteriorates.
To conclude the analysis of the static trading game, I summarize the trading probability in
the equilibrium of the static trading game (for the non-knife-edge cases) when k < Wmax
in Table 1. When θ falls on the boundary of the information region, the equilibrium is
not unique. The buyer will use a mixed strategy of information acquisition. Thus, the set
of trading probabilities is the convex combination of the set of trading probabilities of the
adjacent regions.

VL < CL
VL = CL
VL > CL

θ < θ− (k, ν)
ρH = ρL = 0
ρH = 0, ρL ∈ [0, 1]
ρH = 0, ρL = 1

θ− (k, ν) < θ < θ+ (k, ν)
ρH = fHG , ρL = fLG
ρH = fHG , ρL ∈ [fLG , 1]
ρH = fHG , ρL = 1

θ > θ+ (k, ν)
ρH = ρL = 1
ρH = ρL = 1
ρH = ρL = 1

Table 1: Trading probability when k < Wmax
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1.3.2. Continuation Values
First I introduce some notations that describe the investors’ strategy in the full dynamic
game, allowing for both pure strategy and mixed strategy. I use µ(p, j, t) ∈ [0, 1] to represent
the probability of type j seller accepting offer p at time t. The buyer’s strategy is more
complicated and can be denoted by a couple of functions {i(t), σ(p, ψ, t)}.11 i(t) ∈ [0, 1]
is the probability that the buyer acquires information at time t. σ(p, ψ, t) represents the
probability of offering p in a match at time t when seeing signal ψ. If a buyer does not acquire
information, ψ = N following the previous notation. Therefore, σ(p, N, t) is the buyer’s
probability of offering p in a match at time t conditional on not acquiring information. In
principle, a buyer can draw a price from a mixed distribution. Fortunately, based on the
analysis of the static trading game, the buyer will only choose from three relevant offers at
any time.12 Thus it’s without loss of generality to assume σ(·, ψ, t) is a probability mass
function of p.
With the help of the above notations, we can write down γj (p, t), the probability that a
type j seller is offered price p conditional on meeting a buyer at time t.

γj (p, t) = i(t)

X

fjψ σ(p, ψ, t) + (1 − i(t))σ(p, N, t).

(1.2)

ψ=G ,B

γj (p, t) characterizes the market condition faced by a type j seller at time t. If γj (p, t) has
more weights on high prices of p, the market is more liquid for sellers with assets of quality
j because it’s easier for them to sell the assets at a high price.
The continuation value of sellers with high-quality assets is at least cH since the sellers
can always hold on to their assets. Also, no buyer will offer a price higher than cH in
11
Note that the strategy functions are independent of the identity of any given buyer or seller. This
means that we will focus on equilibria with symmetric strategies without loss of generality because for any
equilibrium with asymmetric strategies, we can find an equilibrium in symmetric strategies with the same
path of asset distributions, trading volume, and average prices.
12
We can pick any p < cL to be the no-trade price.
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equilibrium.13 Therefore

CH (t) = cH .

(1.3)

The previous analysis of the static trading game shows that only three types of prices will
be offered by a buyer at time t: the pooling price CH (t) = cH , the separating price CL (t) or
the no-trade price p < CL (t). Getting an offer at the separating price or the no-trade price
will not change the continuation value of the seller. Therefore, to compute the continuation
value of a low-quality seller, we consider the hypothetical case where the seller always holds
on to the asset unless offered cH . In fact, γj (cH , t) can be viewed as a proxy of endogenous
market liquidity for owners of an asset of quality j. This is especially important for investors
with low-quality assets because it measures the likelihood of extracting information rent in
future meetings. Since the arrival rate of a pooling offer cH for a low-type seller at time
τ is λγL (cH , τ ), for a low-quality seller remaining in the market at time t, the distribution
function of the arrival time of an offer with pooling price cH is 1 − e −λ

Rτ
t

γL (cH ,u)du

. A

low-quality seller’s continuation value is characterized by14
Z
CL (t) =

∞h

i
Rτ
(1 − e −r (τ −t) )cL + e −r (τ −t) cH d(1 − e −λ t γL (cH ,u)du ).

(1.4)

t

The seller enjoys the flow payoff rcL before a pooling offer arrives, and the value jumps to
cH when the seller accepts the offer. If γL (cH , τ ) improves for all future τ > t, the low-type
sellers’ continuation value CL (t) increases.
Now let’s turn to the continuation value of a holder/buyer. A holder enjoys the flow payoff
from an asset and mechanically becomes a seller when hit by a liquidity shock that arrives
13

Otherwise the price of high-quality asset will be unbounded when t goes to infinity
Equivalently, a low-quality seller’s continuation value can be characterized by a differential equation
rCL (t) = rcL + λγL (cH , t) (cH − CL (t)) + dCdtL (t) .
14
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at Poisson rate δ.15 The continuation value of a type-j holder at time t is
∞h

Z
Vj (t) =

i
(1 − e −r (τ −t) )vj + e −r (τ −t) Cj (τ ) d(1 − e −δ(τ −t) ).

(1.5)

t

To derive the gains from trade at time t, we need to compare the continuation values of
sellers and holders. Notice for the high type, CH (t) = cH ,

VH (t) =

rvH + δcH
.
r +δ

(1.6)

As long as δ > 0, VH (t) > CH (t) holds at any time. There are always gains from trade for
high-quality assets. However, the same result doesn’t necessarily hold for low-quality assets
although vL ≥ cL . Taking the difference between (1.5) and (1.4), we have

Z

∞

VL (t) − CL (t) =
t


−r (τ −t)
)(v − cL ) ...
(1 − e
|
{z L
}

(1.7)

flow payoff


Z
−
t

|

τ


−δ(τ −t)
).
e −r (u−t) λγL (cH , u)(cH − CL (u))du 
 d(1 − e
{z
}

(1.8)

information rent

The first component of the integrand represents the holder’s extra benefit from the higher
flow payoff. However, the positive gain is offset by the information rent of the low-type
seller, represented by the second component of the integrand. Notice CL (τ ) ≤

rcL +λcH
r +λ

< cH .

When the low-type seller is likely to be offered a pooling price cH —i.e., γL (cH , u) > 0—she
can take advantage of the liquid market condition and extract information rent from the
buyers. This benefit is not enjoyed by the holder. The buyer/holder has an advantage of
holding the asset because of the higher flow payoff. However, she has a disadvantage in
reselling the asset because her liquidity shock is observable. The fact that an asset holder
seeks to immediately sell her asset on the market reveals that she is holding a low-quality
asset. Whether the gain from trade is positive or negative depends on the relative size
15

The continuation value of a type-j holder can be equivalently characterized by a differential equation
dV (t)
rVj (t) = rvj + δ (Cj (t) − Vj (t)) + dtj .
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of the two components. As the market condition becomes uniformly more liquid (higher
γj (cH , u) for all u > t), the gains from trade decrease. Here I state the following assumption
regarding the information structure of the signal:
Assumption 1.1. fLG >

r +λ vL −cL
λ cH −cL .

Given Assumption 1.1, the gains from trade for low-quality assets could be positive, negative, or zero depending on future market conditions denoted by γL (cH , t). A liquid market
condition in the future (uniformly higher γL (cH , t)) increases the low-quality seller’s incentive to remain in the market and wait for a pooling offer, therefore lowering the gain from
trade. Assumption 1.1 implies that if future buyers always acquire information, the gains
from trade of a low-quality asset are negative. This result is formally stated in Lemma 1.4.
Lemma 1.4. Given Assumption 1.1, VL (t) − CL (t) < 0 if γL (cH , τ ) ≥ fLG for any τ > t.
For Assumption 1.1 to hold, the value difference between the high-type and low-type assets
can not be too small (vL is relatively close to cL instead of cH ). Also, buyers’ signals must be
inaccurate (fLG > 0) so that when they acquire information, there is a large enough chance
that they will offer a pooling price to a low-quality seller.
1.3.3. The Evolution of Asset Quality
The trading probability of each type of asset at any time can be constructed from the
trading strategies. The probability that an asset of quality j is traded in a match at time t
is

ρj (t) =

X

γj (p, t)µ(p, j, t).

(1.9)

{p:µ(p,j,t)>0}

The product γa (p, t)µ(p, a, t) represents the probability that a type a asset is sold at price
p at time t. The summation of the product over p gives us the trading probability.
S (t) and mS (t) represent the masses of high-quality and low-quality assets held by
Let mH
L
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sellers. Since high-quality and low-quality assets are in fixed supply of
spectively, mass

α
1+α

S (t) of high-quality assets and mass
− mH

1
1+α

α
1+α

and

1
1+α

re-

− mLS (t) of low-quality

assets are held by holders. The evolution of asset distribution is fully characterized by the
following differential equations:

α
S
S
− mH (t) − λρH (t)mH
(t),
=δ
1+α


1
ṁLS (t) = δ
− mLS (t) − λρL (t)mLS (t).
1+α

S
ṁH
(t)



(1.10)
(1.11)

In each equation, the right-hand side consists of two terms. The first term represents the
inflow of assets brought into the market by holders who just received liquidity shocks. The
second term represents the outflow of assets because of trading. Since buyers are assigned
to sellers randomly, buyers’ prior beliefs about the quality of their counter-parties’ assets
must be consistent with the market composition of high-quality and low-quality assets. For
this reason, we use the same notation θ(t) to represent both the market composition and
the buyers’ prior belief

θ(t) =

S (t)
mH
.
mLS (t)

(1.12)

Combining (1.10) and (1.11), we can characterize the evolution of the market composition
as
d
δ
α
ln θ(t) = S
(1 − θ(t)/α) −
λ(ρH (t) − ρL (t))
.
|
{z
}
dt
mH (t) 1 + α
|
{z
} trading probability differential

(1.13)

fundamental reversion

S (t) and θ(t). The
The evolution of asset distribution can be equivalently characterized by mH

change in the quality of assets on the market can be decomposed into two effects. The first
effect is the fundamental reversion. When θ(t) < α, the composition of assets on the market
is worse than the fundamental. Therefore, the inflow of assets because of liquidity shocks
improves the quality of assets on the market. On the contrary, the inflow of assets worsens
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the quality of assets on the market when θ(t) > α. Therefore, the market composition tends
to revert to the fundamental. This effect is stronger when the high-quality asset on the
market is a smaller fraction of total stock of high-quality asset in the economy. The second
term is the trading-probability differential. Most previous literature has focused on cases
where low-quality assets trade weakly faster than high-quality assets in illiquid markets. In
those cases, ρH (t) ≤ ρL (t) so the second effect is always weakly positive. In the analysis of
the static trading game, we know that when θ(t) falls in the information acquisition region
and there’s negative gain from trade for low-quality assets, ρH (t) > ρL (t). Therefore, highquality assets leave the market faster than low-quality assets, so the second effect is negative.
The negative trading-probability differential effect generates novel implications for the set
of steady states and market transitions in the dynamic equilibrium.
1.3.4. Equilibrium Definition
The equilibrium of the full dynamic game is defined as follows.16

S (0) , an equilibrium consists
Definition 1.1. Given an initial asset distribution θ(0), mH

S (t) , buyers’ strategies {i(t), σ(p, ψ, t)} and conof paths of asset distribution θ(t), mH
tinuation value functions VH (t), VL (t), sellers’ strategies µ(p, a, t) and continuation value
functions CH (t), CL (t) such that
1. For any time t, given the continuation values VL (t), VH (t), CL (t), CH (t) and the prior
belief θ(t), a buyer’s strategy {i(t), σ(p, ψ, t)} and a seller’s strategy µ(p, a, t) form a
sequential equilibrium of the static trading game.
2. The sellers’ continuation values CH (t) and CL (t) are given by (1.2), (1.3) and (1.4).
The buyers’ continuation values VH (t) and VL (t) are given by (1.5).

S (t) evolves according to (1.10) and (1.13).
3. The asset distribution θ(t), mH
16

This definition makes use of some results in the previous analysis. A complete definition of equilibrium
is given in the Appendix.
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1.4. Stationary Equilibria
In this section, we characterize the set of stationary equilibria of the dynamic trading game,
ignoring the role of the initial asset distribution. A stationary equilibrium is an equilibrium
in which the asset distribution and investors’ trading strategies remain fixed along the
equilibrium path. These stationary equilibria are the steady states of the market in the
long run. We mostly focus on the pure-strategy stationary equilibria while leaving most
of the analysis of mixed-strategy stationary equilibria in the Appendix. The stationary
equilibria can be ranked in terms of the total welfare of the investors.
1.4.1. Construction of Stationary Equilibria
The set of stationary equilibria can be exhausted by guess-and-verify. We start by assuming
a trading strategy for all investors and compute the continuation values V̄H , C̄H , V̄L , C̄L . At
the same time, we can compute the stationary asset distribution, especially the market
composition θ̄, and check if the assumed trading strategies are consistent with the static
trading game (θ̄; V̄H , C̄H , V̄L , C̄L ).
Let ρ̄H and ρ̄L be the trading probability of high-quality and low-quality assets in a match.
The stationary market composition is

θ̄ =

δ + λρ̄L
α.
δ + λρ̄H

(1.14)

If high-quality assets are traded with higher probability in the stationary equilibrium (i.e.,
ρ̄H > ρ̄L ), the stationary market composition is worse than the fundamental α. On the
contrary, if low-quality assets are traded faster, the stationary market composition is better
than the fundamental.
The analysis of the static trading game shows that along any equilibrium path, the continuation values of high-quality assets are fixed at C̄H = cH and V̄H =

rvH +δcH
r +δ ,

independent of

the market conditions. Let γ̄L (cH ) be the constant probability that a low type is offered the
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pooling price cH in any given match in a stationary equilibrium. The low-quality sellers’
and buyers’ continuation values are

C̄L =

rvL + δ C̄L
rcL + λγ̄L (cH )cH
, V̄L =
.
r + λγ̄L (cH )
r +δ

(1.15)

If γ̄L (cH ) is small in a stationary equilibrium, the market features lower liquidity and the
value of owning low-quality assets is low.
Depending on the strategy of the buyer, the pure strategy stationary equilibria can be
put into three categories. Here we describe the information-insensitive pooling stationary
equilibrium and the information-sensitive stationary equilibrium while leaving the analysis of the last case, the information-insensitive separating stationary equilibrium, in the
Appendix.
Information-Insensitive Pooling Stationary Equilibrium (S1 )
In the first case, buyers do not acquire information and always offer the pooling price
cH . Therefore, both high-quality and low-quality assets are traded at the same speed,
ρ̄H,1 = ρ̄L,1 = 1, and the market composition θ̄1 is the same as the fundamental α. Since
the low-type sellers get a pooling offer in each match, γL (cH ) = 1, the continuation values
of the low-type sellers and buyers are

C̄L,1 =

rvL + δ C̄L,1
rcL + λcH
, V̄L,1 =
.
r +λ
r +δ

Notice Assumption 1.1 implies that V̄L,1 < C̄L,1 , so there are no gains from trade between
a buyer and a low type seller. We can check if offering a pooling price without acquiring
information is a buyer’s optimal trading strategy given the market composition and the continuation values in the stationary equilibrium. To simplify the notation, we use θ1− (k) and
θ1+ (k) to represent the upper and lower bound of the information region if the continuation
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values equal to those in the stationary equilibria S1 .
θ1− (k) = θ− (k, V̄L,1 ), θ1+ (k) = θ+ (k, V̄L,1 ).

Lemma 1.5. An information-insensitive pooling stationary equilibrium S1 exists when

α ≥ max


cH − V̄L,1 +
, θ1 (k) .
VH − cH

Lemma 1.5 gives the sufficient and necessary conditions on the fundamental α for the
information-insensitive pooling stationary equilibria to exist. It imposes two lower bounds
on the fundamental α. If k is large, buyers have no incentive to acquire information for
any market composition. In order for buyers to offer a pooling price, θ̄1 must exceed the
threshold for pooling offers. If k is small, θ̄1 must fall in the information-insensitive pooling
region. Notice the threshold θ1+ (k) depends on the low type seller’s continuation value in
the stationary equilibrium.
S1 is the stationary equilibrium with highest market liquidity subject to search frictions.
Both high-type and low-type assets are transferred to the high valuation investors (buyers)
whenever a match is formed. Moreover, buyers do not spend resources on inspecting the
assets. This resembles the market condition in many liquid OTC markets before the financial
crisis. Investors offer similar prices for assets with the same credit ratings without spending
resources to acquire private information regarding the quality of the assets. They do it
for two reasons. First, lemons only account for a small fraction of the assets for sale, and
the composition of assets for sale is unlikely to deteriorate because the fundamental of the
market is strong. Second, the expectation that the market will remain liquid in the future
keeps investors from worrying about obtaining a lemon because they know that later they
will be able to sell it quickly at a high price.
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Information-Sensitive Stationary Equilibrium (S2 )
Now let’s consider a pure strategy stationary equilibrium with information acquisition (i.e.
ī = 1). From the analysis of the static trading game, we know that the pooling price is
offered if and only if a good signal is observed. Therefore, the probability of a low-type
seller getting a pooling offer is γ̄L (cH ) = fLG . The continuation values of the low type sellers
and buyers in S2 are

C̄L,2 =

rcL + λfLG cH
rvL + δ C̄L,2
, V̄L,2 =
.
G
r +δ
r + λfL

(1.16)

In S2 , low-type sellers expect they will receive the offer cH with probability fLG in a match
at any time in the future. Assumption 1.1 implies that C̄L,2 > V̄L,2 , so there’s no gain from
trade with low-type sellers. Buyers will offer the pooling price cH after seeing a good signal
and offer a no-trade price p < C̄L,2 after seeing a bad signal. The probability that an asset
is traded in a match is equal to the probability that a good signal is generated by the asset,
so ρ̄H,2 = fHG , ρ̄L,2 = fLG . Since the high-quality assets are traded faster, the stationary
market composition is worse than the fundamental.

θ̄2 =

δ + λfLG
· α < α.
δ + λfHG

(1.17)

To check whether the assumed trading strategies indeed form a stationary equilibrium,
we need to verify that the stationary market composition falls in the information-sensitive
region given the continuation values. Let
θ2− (k) = θ− (k, V̄L,2 ), θ2+ (k) = θ+ (k, V̄L,2 ).

be the lower and upper bounds of the information region when the continuation values are
equal to those in S2 , Lemma 1.6 gives the sufficient and necessary conditions for the pure
strategy information-sensitive stationary equilibrium to exist.
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Lemma 1.6. Suppose Assumption 1.1 is true. An information-sensitive stationary equilibrium S2 exists if and only if
δ + λfHG +
δ + λfHG −
·
θ
(k)
≤
α
≤
· θ (k).
2
δ + λfLG
δ + λfLG 2

Lemma 1.6 puts a lower bound and an upper bound on the fundamental. From the expressions for the information region in Lemma 1.3, we know the information region exists when
k is small. Therefore, S2 doesn’t exist when k is above a threshold value. In S2 , the market
is less liquid than in the information-insensitive pooling stationary equilibrium S1 . Buyers
are cautious about the composition of assets on the market, and they always acquire information. As buyers rely on an inaccurate signal, high-quality sellers sometimes receive bad
quotes because their asset is taken to be a lemon. It takes longer for a high-quality seller
to find an acceptable price in the market compared with the liquid stationary equilibrium
S1 . As for the low-quality sellers, there is still a positive probability that they will receive
a pooling offer since the buyers sometimes mistakenly take lemons for good assets. If the
signal is noisy enough, as in Assumption 1.1, the expected information rent received by a
low-quality seller is higher than the difference in discounted flow payoff between a seller
and a buyer. Therefore, low-quality sellers demand a high price that the buyers are not
willing to offer unless a good signal is observed. As a result, low-quality sellers stay in the
market longer than high-quality sellers. The rent seeking behavior of low-quality sellers
has two negative effects on the allocative efficiency in the market. The first effect is direct:
low-quality assets are not traded immediately when a buyer arrives, even if the buyer has
a higher flow payoff for holding the asset. The second effect is indirect: as low-quality
sellers stay longer in the market, the market composition remains below the fundamental
and therefore reduces buyers’ incentive to offer pooling prices.
Proposition 1.1 shows that the information-insensitive pooling stationary equilibrium S1
and the information-sensitive stationary equilibrium S2 coexist when the fundamental α is
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within an intermediate region.
Proposition 1.1 (Coexistence of S1 and S2 ). Suppose Assumption 1.1 is true. Let A1 (k)
and A2 (k) be

A1 (k) = max

θ1+ (k),


δ + λfHG −
· θ (k) ,
δ + λfLG 2

A2 (k) =

δ + λfHG +
· θ (k).
δ + λfLG 2

S1 and S2 co-exist if and only if α ∈ [A1 (k), A2 (k)]. When k is small, A1 (k) < A2 (k).
When agents hold the belief that the market will be liquid as in S1 in the future, the value
of a low-quality asset is high for both sellers and buyers. Buyers are willing to offer the
pooling price without acquiring information for a wide range of the market composition.
Also, as buyers acquire assets without any selection, the market composition remains at the
fundamental value. However, when agents believe the market will be partially illiquid as
in S2 , the value of a low-quality asset becomes lower. The information-insensitive pooling
region shrinks. At the same time, as buyers cream-skim the market, the market composition
stays below the fundamental. Both the trading effect and the valuation effect justify the
buyers’ information acquisition behavior.
1.4.2. Welfare Analysis
The total welfare along an equilibrium path is given by

ε=

α
1
vH +
vL
1 +Z α
1+α
h
i
∞
S
S
−
e −rt rmH
(t)(vH − cH ) + rmLS (t)(vL − cL ) + λ(mH
(t) + mLS (t))i(t)k dt. (1.18)
0

The first line of the right-hand side

α
1+α vH

+

1
1+α vL

represents the welfare in a frictionless

benchmark. In the benchmark, assets can be moved from shocked investors to unshocked
investors instantaneously. However, due to search frictions and information frictions, some
assets are held by shocked investors in equilibrium. The first and the second term in the
integrand of (1.18) represents the welfare loss because of market illiquidity. The third term
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represents the welfare loss from the resources devoted to information acquisition.
From (1.10) and (1.11) we can solve for the stationary asset distribution characterized by
the mass of high-quality and low-quality assets held by sellers,

S
m̄H
=

δα
δ
, m̄LS =
.
(δ + λρ̄H )(1 + α)
(δ + λρ̄L )(1 + α)

(1.19)

Using the trading probability and (1.19) for stationary asset distribution, we can write down
the welfare loss ∆ = αvH + (1 − α)vL − ε in each stationary equilibrium:
δα
δ(1 − α)
∆1 =
(vH − cH ) +
(vL − cL ),
δ
+
λ
δ
+
λ




δα
λk
δ(1 − α)
λk
∆2 =
v
−
c
+
+
v
−
c
+
.
H
H
L
L
r
r
δ + λfHG
δ + λfLG

The welfare loss in S1 is lower than that in S2 . In S2 , sellers hold a larger mass of both highquality and low-quality assets, and buyers are paying extra costs of information acquisition
compared to S1 . As we previously pointed out, S1 is the most efficient stationary equilibrium
subject to search frictions.

1.5. Non-Stationary Equilibria
In the previous section we investigated various states of the market in the long run. Now
we turn to analyze how investors’ trading behavior and market liquidity evolve over time
starting from a given initial asset distribution. Particularly, we are interested in the following question. When a liquid steady state and an illiquid steady state co-exist, is it possible
for the market to transition from one to the other? In order to answer this question, it is
important to study the set of non-stationary equilibria.
To show the existence of a certain equilibrium path from an initial asset distribution to a
terminal steady state, we first hypothesize about investors’ trading strategies for any t > 0.
Given the paths of trading probability ρH (t) and ρL (t) and the initial asset distribution
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S (0) and mS (0), the full path of the asset distribution can be analytically
represented by mH
L

solved from (1.10) and (1.11) as follows:
Z t
δα
e −(δ+λρH (u)(t−s))du ds,
=e
+
1+α 0
Z t
R
δ
S
− 0t δ+λρL (s)ds S
mL (0) +
mL (t) = e
e −(δ+λρL (u)(t−s))du ds.
1+α 0

S
mH
(t)

−

Rt
0

δ+λρH (s)ds

S
mH
(0)

(1.20)
(1.21)

Next we can compute the paths of continuation values to verify whether the assumed trading
strategies form an equilibrium of the static trading game at any t > 0.
In the Appendix, I provide sufficient conditions for the market composition θ(t) to change
monotonically along a non-stationary equilibrium path.
1.5.1. Self-fulfilling Market Freeze
Suppose the market has an asset distribution as in the liquid state S1 . Is it possible that all
investors suddenly change their beliefs and coordinate to follow an equilibrium path that
converges to the illiquid state S2 ? This question is answered in Proposition 1.2.
Proposition 1.2 (Self-fulfilling Market Freeze). If Assumption 1.1 holds, for small k there
exists

A3 (k) = θ2+ (k) ∈ (A1 (k), A2 (k)),
such that, for any α ∈ [A1 (k), A3 (k)], starting from an initial asset distribution in the
neighborhood of S1 , there is an equilibrium path that converges to S2 .
When α ∈ [A1 (k), A3 (k)], the model has multiple equilibria starting from the asset distribution of S1 . Proposition 1.2 implies that a liquid market can go through a self-fulfilling
market freeze. Starting from the asset distribution in S1 , if all investors believe that future
buyers will not acquire information and always offer the pooling price, the current buyers
have no incentive to acquire information and they continue to offer the pooling price. The

28

market therefore remains in the liquid steady state of S1 . However, if all investors believe
the market liquidity will begin to decline and buyers in the future will begin to acquire
information as a way of avoiding low-quality assets, the continuation value of holding low
quality assets drops immediately. Thus, for current buyers, the loss incurred by buying a
low-quality asset at the pooling price becomes larger, and this gives them more incentive
to acquire information. When current buyers acquire information but their independent
evaluation of the assets are not accurate enough, high-quality assets are traded faster than
low-quality assets, resulting in a cream-skimming effect on the market composition. The
market composition deteriorates over time and justifies future buyers’ information acquisition. Therefore, the market evolves along a path with information acquisition and converges
to the information-sensitive steady state S2 .
Notice that Proposition 1.2 does not imply that the information-insensitive pooling steady
state is unstable. In fact, the liquid steady state is locally stable.
Proposition 1.3. If α, θ(0) > θ1+ (k), there exists an equilibrium path with pooling offers
and no information acquisition that converges to S1 .
The results of Propositions 1.2 and 1.3 can be illustrated graphically. In Figures 3 and 4 I
plot the phase diagram of the evolution of asset distributions according to (1.10) and (1.13).
The horizontal axis represents the market composition that determines the current investors’
trading strategies. The vertical axis represents the mass of sellers with high-quality assets in
the market. Although the mass of high-quality sellers does not affect the current investors’
trading strategies directly, it shapes the evolution of the asset distribution through the
interaction with market composition. Recall that the evolution of the asset distribution
depends on the trading probability of different assets, which in turn depends on investors’
belief about future market liquidity through resale considerations. Therefore, before we
plot a phase diagram, we need to specify investor’s continuation values according to their
belief about future market liquidity.
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Figure 3 shows the phase diagram when all investors believe future buyers will not acquire
information but instead will always make pooling offers. Given this belief, the continuation
values of owners of low-quality assets are V̄L,1 and C̄L,1 . The corresponding informationsensitive region is given by [θ1− (k), θ1+ (k)], represented by the shaded region in the figure.
If the fundamental α is above θ1+ (k), there exists an information-insensitive pooling steady
state, represented by the stationary asset distribution S1 on the right of the shaded region.
If the investors maintain their belief about a liquid market in the future, the market will
stay in S1 . Moreover, as Proposition 1.3 shows, starting from any asset distribution to the
right of the shaded region, there is a path converging to S1 . Along the path, the asset
composition is always above θ1+ (k), consistent with the investors’ belief that there is no
need for information acquisition.
What happens when investors’ beliefs shifts? Suppose the market starts out with the asset
distribution in S1 , but investors suddenly start to believe that investors in the future will
acquire information and the market will become illiquid. The phase diagram changes from
Figure 3 to 4. The continuation values of owning low-quality assets drop to V̄L,2 and C̄L,2 ,
the same as in the information-sensitive steady state. Since the continuation values become
lower, the information-sensitive region moves to the right, represented by the shaded region
in Figure 4. The asset composition is good enough to support pooling trading in S1 when
investors believe in a liquid market in the future. However, after the shift in the investors’
beliefs, S1 is now in the shaded information-sensitive region, reflecting higher incentives to
acquire information when investors anticipate lower liquidity in the future. The market will
therefore follow the arrows and move to S2 . The whole path lies within the shaded region,
meaning that buyers always acquire information along the path, consistent with investors’
belief in low liquidity in the future. The transition from S1 to S2 is consistent with an event
of a self-fulfilling market freeze, in which trading delays suddenly become longer.
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Figure 3: Phase Diagram (VL (t) = V̄L,1 , CL (t) = C̄L,1 ).
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Figure 4: Phase Diagram (VL (t) = V̄L,2 , CL (t) = C̄L,2 ).

31

𝜃 𝑡

1.5.2. Information Trap
If the market’s initial asset distribution is in the illiquid state S2 , is there a non-stationary
equilibrium path that converges to liquid trading? The answer depends on the relationship
between the market composition in S2 and the information-sensitive region [θ1− (k), θ1+ (k)]
in S1 . This can be illustrated in the same set of phase diagrams. In Figure 3 and Figure
4, the information acquisition regions in S1 and S2 overlap and the illiquid state S2 falls
in the overlapping region. Starting from the initial asset distribution in S2 , if all investors
hold the belief that future buyers will acquire information, S2 is in the shaded informationsensitive region in Figure 4, consistent with the investors’ belief. Now suppose all investors
believe that in the future, buyers will not acquire information and will always offer the
pooling price. This optimistic belief in future market liquidity improves the continuation
values, changing the phase diagram to Figure 3 and shifting the information-sensitive region
to [θ1− (k), θ1+ (k)]. However, since S2 is also in the shaded information-sensitive region in
Figure 3, current buyers will still acquire information and cream-skim the market. Their
trading behavior keeps the asset distribution at S2 and prevents the market from recovering
to S1 . To summarize, if the market composition in S2 satisfies θ̄2 < θ1+ (k), there is no
equilibrium path that converges to the liquid state S1 .
Now let’s consider the opposite case if θ̄2 ≥ θ1+ (k). Starting from the initial asset distribution
in S2 , when investors believe the market will be liquid in the future, the optimal strategy for
a buyer is to stop acquiring information and to instead offer the pooling price. As a result,
the market composition will gradually improves and converges to θ̄1 , the market composition
in S1 . Along this path, buyers do not acquire information. Therefore, if θ̄2 ≥ θ1+ (k), there
exists a non-stationary equilibrium path that transitions from S2 to S1 .
Assumption 1.2.

fHG fLB
fLG fHB

>

cH −V̄L,2
.
cH −V̄L,1

Assumption 1.2 is equivalent to the condition θ2− (0) < θ1+ (0). If Assumption 1.2 is true,
θ2− (k) < θ1+ (k) holds for small k so that the two information acquisition regions overlap.
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The intuitive interpretation of Assumption 1.2 is that it requires the signal to be relatively
accurate so given any set of continuation values, information acquisition is optimal for a
wide range of market composition. Otherwise, if the information available to be buyers is
very noisy, information acquisition is irrelevant most of the time.17
I call the overlapping part of the two information-sensitive regions [θ2− (k), θ1+ (k)] the information trap whenever it exists. The information trap is different from the information
sensitive regions we just discussed. At any time t, the information sensitive region depends
on the continuation values of owning low-quality assets VL (t), CL (t). However, by definition, the information trap is time and strategy invariant so it is independent of investors’
beliefs and the continuation values. When the market composition is within the information
trap, whether or not investors believe that future buyers will acquire information or not,
the optimal strategy is to acquire information today, and the cream-skimming effect will
be in play. Intuitively speaking, the market composition will be trapped in the region and
dragged into the “sink,” which is the information-sensitive state S2 .18
Proposition 1.4 formally conveys the condition in which there is no non-stationary equilibrium path that transitions from S2 to S1 .
Proposition 1.4 (Information Trap). If Assumption 1.1 and 1.2 hold, for small k there
exists

A4 (k) =

δ + λfHG +
· θ (k) ∈ (A1 (k), A2 (k)),
δ + λfLG 1

(1.22)

such that, for any α ∈ [A1 (k), A4 (k)], if the initial asset distribution is in the neighborhood
of S2 , there is no equilibrium path converging to pooling trading.
17

Assumption 1.2 is not in conflict with Assumption 1.1. Assumption 1.1 requires that fLG is not too small
so the buyer can make a mistake in the inspection and take a low-quality asset as a “good” one. However,
it does not put any restrictions on the signals observed from a high-quality asset. When fHG gets closer to 1,
the left-hand side of Assumption 1.2 goes to ∞.
18
In Appendix 1.12, I consider whether there exists a non-stationary equilibrium path that converges to
the liquid state S1 , starting from an arbitrary initial market composition θ(0) in the information trap. I
provide the sufficient and necessary conditions such that the equilibrium path exists.
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Propositions 1.2 and 1.4 jointly imply that, for α ∈ [A1 (k), min {A3 (k), A4 (k)}], the liquid
steady state S1 and the illiquid steady state S2 coexist. More importantly, the transitions
between the two steady states are asymmetric. Suppose the market is in the liquid state
S1 where buyers are not paying any attention to the idiosyncratic features of the assets.
They simply buy assets at the pooling price from any seller they meet in the market. The
market composition remains at a high level. A self-fulfilling market freeze starts from a
market-wide panic about a decline in future market liquidity. Investors worry that if they
hold low-quality assets in the portfolio, in the future, it will be hard for them to sell these
assets at good prices. Because of this concern, buyers start to collect information and
carefully evaluate the assets they see on the market. They are only willing to offer a good
price for an asset if the aspects of the asset satisfy their own criteria. However, because
buyers’ evaluations of assets are not perfect, sellers who receive a bad quote will stay in the
market with the hope that they will receive a high quote from the next buyer. The trading
speeds of both types of assets drop immediately, and the value of low-quality assets to
the current owners decline. As the market goes further down the illiquid path, the market
composition deteriorates gradually as low-quality assets accumulate in the market. At some
point, the market composition becomes bad enough that it falls into the information trap.
Even if buyers have optimistic beliefs about future market liquidity, since the current market
composition is bad, they keep acquiring information to avoid buying low-quality assets at
high prices. The low liquidity and the bad market composition reinforce each other through
buyers’ information acquisition, and the market can not recover to the liquid state.

1.6. Policy Implications
In this section we explore two policy implications of the model.
1.6.1. Issuance Transparency
Transparency in the issuance process of ABS was low before the latest financial crisis. The
low issuance transparency has been criticized for generating moral hazard problems in the

34

securitization process and adverse selection problems in the secondary market, which played
important roles in the creation and propagation of the financial crisis. After the financial
crisis, regulators moved toward a more transparent issuance process. For example, DoddFrank Act Section 942 requires issuers of asset-backed securities (ABS) to provide asset-level
information according to specified standards.19 In the context of my model, these regulatory
changes could lower the cost of information acquisition and increase the precision of buyers’
signals.
0

Definition 1.2. A signal ψ 0 is (weakly) more precise than a signal ψ if and only if fHG ≥ fHG
0

and fLG ≤ fLG .
We use two simple criteria to evaluate the effect of increasing transparency on the liquidity
of the secondary market. First, we look at θ1+ (k), since the liquid steady state S1 exists if
and only if α > θ1+ (k). Second, we consider A4 (k). When α > A4 (k), there is no steady
state in the information trap.
Proposition 1.5. If both ψ 0 and ψ satisfy Assumption 1.1 and 1.2, and ψ 0 is more precise
than ψ, both θ1+ (k) and A4 (k) increase when switching from the signal structure ψ to ψ 0 ,
and when k decreases.
Proposition 1.5 implies that increasing transparency in the issuance process can harm market liquidity, judging by our simple criteria. An intuitive explanation of this result is that
when issuers provide more information regarding the pool of assets backing the ABS, future
investors can better evaluate the assets’ quality upon conducting due diligence. This gives
buyers more incentive to acquire information, and when they do so, the cream-skimming
effect is stronger. It is worth mentioning that I only consider the impact of increasing
transparency on the liquidity of the secondary market and ignore the impact on disciplining
the issuance process. A complete evaluation of these types of polices should take effects on
both the primary and the secondary markets into consideration.
19

See https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank-section.shtml#942.
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1.6.2. Asset Purchase Programs
When a market freezes because of the adverse selection problem, a natural solution is
to clean the market by removing low-quality assets from the market. Many theoretical
papers have studied the design of asset purchase programs in the presence of severe adverse
selection, including Philippon and Skreta (2012), Tirole (2012), Camargo and Lester (2014)
and Chiu and Koeppl (2016). During the latest financial crisis, the US Treasury created the
Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP) to purchase “toxic” assets, aiming at restoring
liquidity in the markets for legacy Commercial MBS and non-agency RMBS.
Asset purchase programs can help the target market restore liquid trading through two
channels. First, it removes lemons from the market, so the fundamentals of the market
improves. Second, if the government purchases assets at a higher price than the market
would offer, or selling assets to the government is easier than locating a buyer in the private
sector, the asset purchase program effectively increases the value of lemons. As a result,
the lemon’s problem is mitigated and buyers in the market are more willing to offer pooling
prices.
In my model, when the market goes through a self-fulfilling market freeze from S1 to S2 ,
the market composition deteriorates gradually and the mass of “toxic” assets on the market increases over time. In the proof of Proposition 1.2, I show that θ(t) decreases and
s (t) increases over time along the path of market freeze. There exists a time t̂ such that
mH

θ(t̂) = θ1+ (k). If the government intervenes before t̂, the market composition is above the
information trap. There still exists an equilibrium path that converges to liquid trading.
Therefore, market liquidity can be boosted by a plan that guarantees a floor-price for all
assets. The government does not need to actually purchase assets from the market since
the market will immediately return to liquid trading as buyers all stop acquiring information. However, after t̂, the market enters the information trap and there is no self-fulfilling
equilibrium path that returns to S1 . The government needs to purchase a positive amount
of assets to revive the market.
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Chiu and Koeppl (2016) study the announcement effect of asset purchase programs. Specifically, when the government announces that it will purchase a given amount of lemons at
a given price later at a given time, it is possible that the market will restore to liquid
trading even before the government actually purchases these assets. Thus the government
may be justified in delaying the purchase to lower the intervention cost. However, a direct
implication of Proposition 1.4 is that in an illiquid steady state within the information
trap, there is no announcement effect for any asset purchase program with purchasing price
p ∈ [C̄L,2 , C̄L,1 ].

1.7. Conclusions
In this paper, I present a model for studying the interaction between buyers’ information acquisition and market liquidity in over-the-counter markets with adverse-selection problems.
Buyers can acquire information to avoid buying low-quality assets, and their incentive for
doing so is strong if they expect that the market will be illiquid when they resell their assets.
When buyers’ signals are inaccurate, information acquisition has a cream-skimming effect
on the composition of assets for sale and harms future market liquidity. The interaction of
resale consideration and the cream-skimming effect gives rise to multiple steady states and
asymmetric transitions between steady states. Specifically, the market can transition from
a liquid state without information acquisition to an illiquid state with information acquisition, but it can not transition back. This uni-directional transition between different steady
states is a novel feature of my model that, to the best of my knowledge, is not present in
the models used in previous papers on dynamic adverse selection. This result helps explain
the continued low liquidity in the non-agency residential mortgage-backed-security market
in spite of the recovery of the US economy and the housing markets.

1.8. Appendix 1: Alternative Definition of Equilibrium
Here I provide a formal but less intuitive equilibrium definition which is equivalent to the
definition provided in Section 1.3.
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S (t), mS (t) ,
Definition 1.3. A equilibrium consists of paths of asset distribution θ(t), mH
L
buyers’ policy functions {i(t), σ(p, ψ, t)} and value functions {VH (t), VL (t)}, seller’s policy
function µ(p, j, t) and value functions {CH (t), CL (t)}, which satisfy the following conditions:
1. Seller’s optimality condition: For any j ∈ {H, L},



1,



µ(p, j, t) =
[0, 1],





0,

if p > Cj (t),
if p = Cj (t),

(1.23)

if p < Cj (t).

2. Buyer’s optimality conditions:
(a) For ψ ∈ {G , B}, σ(p, ψ, t) > 0 only if p solves

J(ψ, t) = max
p

1
θ(t) ψ
fH µ(p, H, t) [VH (t) − p] +
f ψ µ(p, L, t) [VL (t) − p] ;
θ(t) + 1
θ(t) + 1 L

(b) σ(p, N, t) > 0 only if p solves

J(N, t) = max
p

θ(t)
1
µ(p, H, t) [VH (t) − p] +
µ(p, L, t) [VL (t) − p] ;
θ(t) + 1
θ(t) + 1

(c) The value of information W (t) is

W (t) = max {J(G , t) + J(B, t) − J(N, t), 0} ,

and i(t) satisfies



1,



i(t) =
[0, 1],




 0,
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if W (t) > k,
if W (t) = k,
if W (t) < k.

(1.24)

3. The continuation values of sellers Cj (t) are given by (1.2),(1.3) and (1.4). The continuation values of buyers/holders Vj (t) are given by (1.5).
S (t), mS (t) and θ(t) evolves according to
4. The asset distribution, characterized by mH
L

(1.11)-(1.13).

1.9. Appendix 2: Other Stationary Equilibria
1.9.1. Pure-Strategy Stationary Equilibria
Information-Insensitive Separating Stationary Equilibrium (S3 )
When the stationary market composition falls in the information-insensitive region with
separating offers, the market is in an information-insensitive separating stationary equilibrium. This is the third and the last type of stationary equilibrium with pure strategies. In
S3 , buyers do not acquire information and only offers the separating price. Therefore, the
low-quality assets are traded with probability 1 in each match and the high-quality assets
are never traded. ρ̄H,3 = 0, ρ̄L,3 = 1. The stationary equilibria market composition is better
than the fundamental.

θ̄3 =

δ+λ
· α > α.
δ

(1.25)

Since the pooling price is never offered in equilibrium, the continuation values of low-quality
asset owners are

C̄L,3 = cL , V̄L,3 =

rvL + δcL
.
r +δ

It’s easy to verify that V̄L,3 > C̄L,3 so there are gains from trade for low-quality assets.
Similarly, let
θ3− (k) = θ− (k, C̄L,3 ), θ3+ (k) = θ+ (k, C̄L,3 )
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be the lower and upper bounds of the information-sensitive region when the continuation
values are equal to those in S3
Lemma 1.7. An information-insensitive separating stationary equilibrium S3 exists if and
only if
δ
min
α≤
δ+λ




cH − cL −
, θ (k) .
VH − cH 3

In S3 , all high-quality assets and a fraction of low-quality assets are on the market. Yet,
the fundamental of the market is so bad that the amount of lemons on the market is
large enough to prevent any pooling offers or information acquisition from buyers. The
continuation values of low-quality asset owners are the lowest in all possible equilibria.
1.9.2. Mixed-Strategy Equilibria
Here we provide two useful results that restrict the set of possible mixed strategies in
equilibrium.
Lemma 1.8. In any equilibrium, if i(t) > 0, σ(cH , G , t) = 1 and σ(cH , B, t) = 0.
Lemma 1.8 applies to all equilibrium path. It implies a buyer will offer the pooling price cH
if and only if a good signal is observed. The proof is intuitive. Based on the analysis of the
static trading game, it is clear that given any set of continuation values, buyers only choose
between two price. Without loss of generality, assume the buyer offers price p1 after seeing
a good signal and mix between p1 and p2 after seeing a bad signal. Since the buyer uses
mixed strategy after seeing a bad signal, then the expected payoff from offering the two
prices based on the posterior belief of seeing a bad signal must be the same. Therefore, the
expected payoff doesn’t change if the buyer offer p1 with probability 1 after seeing a bad
signal. This makes the buyer’s offer independent of the signal. Thus, the buyer can simply
offer p1 without information acquisition and save the fixed cost. The above reasoning shows
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the sub-optimality of using mixed strategy after acquiring information. We can us Lemma
1.8 to simplify (1.2), in any equilibrium,


γL (t) = i(t)fLG + 1 − ī(t) σ(cH , N, t).

(1.26)

Do sellers randomize in equilibrium? Obviously, sellers of low-quality assets always accept
the pooling price cH . Also, sellers of high-quality assets always accept the pooling price cH
in any equilibrium. If sellers of high-quality assets accept price cH with a probability less
than 1, a buyer can raise the offer by a tiny amount and increase the surplus by VH − CH
with a strictly positive probability. Following the same logic, if sellers of low-quality assets
randomize when offered a separating price, C̄L must be equal to V̄L . In stationary equilibria,
this implies that γ̄L = λr (vL − cL )/(cH − vL ). By Assumption 1.1, γ̄L < fLG . Using (1.26), we
immediately have the following lemma.
Lemma 1.9. If Assumption 1.1 holds, in any stationary equilibria with sellers of low-quality
assets using mixed strategies, we have ī < 1 and σ̄(cH , N) < fLG .
If buyers randomize between a separating offer and a no-trade offer, the gains from trade
of low-quality assets must be zero, VL (t) = CL (t). We say two equilibria are equivalent
when sellers and buyers of both high-quality and low-quality assets have the same trading
probability and continuation values at any give time. Any equilibrium with buyer mixing
between a separating offer and a no-trade offer is equivalent to an equilibrium with buyers
only offering the separating price and sellers rejecting the offer with a positive probability.
This equivalence allows us to focus on mixed-strategy equilibria in which buyers only choose
between the separating offer and the pooling offer.
Mixed-Strategy Stationary Equilibrium without Information Acquisition
Any mixed strategy stationary equilibrium without information acquisition must have buyers using mixed strategies. It is sufficient to consider buyers mixing between the pooling
price cH and the separating price C̄L . Notice in any equilibrium without information ac41

quisition, the probability of buyer offering cH is equal to γL . When buyers do not acquire
information, whether they offer the separating price or the no-trade price depends on the
relationship between V̄L and C̄L . Since in a stationary equilibrium, V̄L is a weighted average
of vL and C̄L , it’s equivalent to compare C̄L and vL . There are three cases:
1. (S4 ) C̄L > vL . This is the case when buyers offer cH with probability γ̄L,4 and the no
trade price with probability 1 − γ̄L,4 . In each match, either type of asset is traded
with probability γ̄L,4 . (1.15) implies that γ̄L,4 > λr (vL − cL )/(cH − vL ). This stationary
equilibria exists when the following conditions are satisfied:
cH − V̄L,1
cH − vL
<α<
,
VH − cH
VH − cH
α
k ≥ (fLB − fHB )(VH − cH )
.
1+α
The market liquidity γ̄L,4 is determined by α =

cH −V̄L,4
VH −cH

(1.27)
(1.28)

and (1.15).

2. (S5 ) C̄L < vL . In this stationary equilibrium buyers offer cH with probability γ̄L,5
and the separating price C̄L,5 with probability 1 − γ̄L,5 . Low-quality sellers accept
the separating offer for sure. In each match, a high-quality asset is traded with
probability γ̄L,5 and a low-quality asset is always traded. If this stationary equilibrium
exists, (α, k) must satisfy the following conditions given a market liquidity γ̄L,5 ∈
(0, λr (vL − cL )/(cH − vL )).
rcL + λγ̄L,5 cH
,
r + λγ̄L,5
cH − C̄L,5
δ+λ
=
· α,
VH − cH
δ + λγ̄L,5
cH − C̄L,5
k ≥ (fLB − fHB )(VH − cH ) ·
.
VH − C̄L,5
C̄L,5 =

3. (S6 ) C̄L = vL . In this stationary equilibria, buyers offer cH with probability γ̄L,6 =
r
λ (vL −cL )/(cH −vL )

and the separating price c̄L,6 with probability 1− γ̄L,6 . Low-quality
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sellers accept the separating offer with probability µ̄(vL , L) ∈ (0, 1). For the stationary
equilibria to exist, (α, k) must satisfy the following conditions
δ + λγ̄L,6 cH − vL
cH − vL
·
<α<
,
δ+λ
VH − cH
VH − cH
cH − vL
k ≥ (fLb − fHb )(VH − cH ) ·
.
VH − vL
where µ̄(vL , L) is the solution to
δ + λγ̄L,6
cH − vL
·
= α.
δ + λ [γ̄L,6 + µ̄(vL , L)(1 − γ̄L,6 )] VH − cH

(1.29)

Mixed-strategy equilibrium with partial information acquisition
Now let’s turn to the mixed-strategy stationary equilibria with ī ∈ (0, 1). In any equilibrium,
buyers always offer cH after observing a good signal.
1. (S7 ) First let’s consider stationary equilibria with θ̄ located on the right boundary of
the information-sensitive region. Since θ̄ > θ̂, when buyers do not acquire information,
they offer the pooling price. Therefore γ̄L,7 = ī7 fLG + 1 − ī7 . Notice γ̄L,7 > fLG .
Assumption 1.1 implies that C̄L,7 > vL , so there’s no gain from trade for low-quality
assets. Low-quality assets will not be traded if a bad signal is observed. High-quality
and low-quality assets are traded with probability ρ̄H,7 = ī7 fHG +1−ī7 , while low-quality
assets are traded with probability ρ̄L,7 = ī7 fLG +1− ī7 . The stationary equilibria market
composition θ̄7 is given by (1.14). S7 exists if and only if the following conditions are
satisfied:

θ+ (k, V̄L,7 ) ≥
α=

cH − V̄L,7
,
VH − cH

δ + λρ̄H,7 +
· θ (k, V̄L,7 )
δ + λρ̄L,7

(1.30)
(1.31)

2. (S8 ) The next group of stationary equilibria we investigate has θ̄ located on the left
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boundary of the information-sensitive region. Since θ̄ < θ̂, buyers never offer the
pooling price without information acquisition. Therefore γ̄L,8 = ī8 fLG . High-quality
assets are traded with probability ρ̄H,8 = ī8 fHG . The probability that a low type asset
is traded depends on whether there’s gain from trade. Given different ī8 , there are
three cases:
• If ī8 >

r
λfLG

(vL −cL )/(cH −vL ), the gain from trade of low-quality assets is negative.

Low-quality assets are traded with probability ρ̄L,8 = γ̄L,8 .
• If ī8 <

r
λfLG

(vL −cL )/(cH −vL ), the gain from trade of low-quality assets is positive.

Low-quality assets are traded with probability ρ̄l,8 = 1.
• If ī8 =

r
λfLG

(vL − cL )/(cH − vL ), the gain from trade of low-quality assets is zero.

Sellers of low-quality assets can use mixed strategies when offered the separating
price. Low-quality assets are traded with probability ρ̄l,8 ∈ [γ̄L,8 , 1].
The continuation values of the owners of low-quality assets are given by (1.15). The

stationary equilibria market composition θ̄8 is given by (1.14). Let ν̄8 = min V̄L,8 , C̄L,8 .
S8 with a given ī8 ∈ (0, 1) exists if and only the following conditions are satisfied:
θ− (k, ν8 ) ≥
α=

cH − ν̄8
,
VH − cH

δ + λρ̄H,8 −
· θ (k, ν̄8 ).
δ + λρ̄L,8

(1.32)
(1.33)

3. (S9 ) The last group of stationary equilibria features buyer’s partial information acquisition and mixed offering strategy when information is not acquired. Buyers acquire
information with probability ī9 . In case the buyers do not acquire information, they
offer the pooling price with probability σ̄(cH , N). Therefore, γ̄L,9 = ī9 fLG + σ̄(cH , N).
High-quality assets are traded with probability ρ̄h,9 = ī9 fLG + σ̄(cH , N). The probability that low type assets are traded depends on the gain from trade of low-quality
assets. There are three cases depending on γ̄L,9 :
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• If ī9 > λr (vL − cL )/(cH − vL ), the gain from trade of low-quality assets is negative.
Low-quality assets are traded with probability ρ̄L,9 = γ̄L,9 .
• If ī9 < λr (vL − cL )/(cH − vL ), the gain from trade of low-quality assets is positive.
Low-quality assets are traded with probability ρ̄L,9 = 1.
• If ī9 =

r
λ (vL

− cL )/(cH − vL ), the gain from trade of low-quality assets is zero.

Sellers of low-quality assets can use mixed strategies when offered the separating
price. Low-quality assets are traded with probability ρ̄l,9 ∈ [γ̄L,9 , 1].
The continuation values of the owners of low-quality assets are given by (1.15). The

stationary equilibria market composition θ̄9 is given by (1.14). Let ν̄9 = min V̄L,9 , C̄L,9 .
S9 with given ī9 ∈ (0, 1) and σ̄(cH , N) exists if and only if the following conditions are
satisfied:
cH − ν̄9
,
VH − ν̄9
cH − ν̄9
·
.
VH − cH

k = (fLB − fHB )(VH − cH ) ·
α=

δ + λρ̄H,9
δ + λρ̄L,9

(1.34)
(1.35)

1.10. Appendix 3: Monotonicity of Paths of Market Composition
Define ρ̄H0 and ρ̄L0 as

ρ̄H0

δ
=
λ






α
δ
1
− 1 , ρ̄L0 =
−1 .
S (0)(1 + α)
λ mLS (0)(1 + α)
mH

(1.36)

Compared with (1.19), if the initial asset distribution is an stationary distribution, ρ̄H0
and ρ̄L0 are the corresponding trading probability of high-quality and low-quality assets. A
higher ρ̄H0 (ρ̄L0 ) is related to a smaller initial mass of high-quality(low-quality) assets in
the market. Note that ρ̄H0 > ρ̄L0 if and only if θ(0) < α, while ρ̄H0 < ρ̄L0 if and only if
θ(0) > α. In the follow lemma, we give two scenarios in which the market composition θ(t)
converges monotonically to a new steady state along an equilibrium path.
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Lemma 1.10. Assume ρH (t) = ρ̄H and ρL (t) = ρ̄L ,
1. θ(t) is decreasing (increasing) in t ∈ (0, +∞) if ρ̄L0 ≥ ρ̄H0 ≥ ρ̄H ≥ ρ̄L (ρ̄H0 ≥ ρ̄L0 ≥
ρ̄L ≥ ρ̄H );
2. if ρ̄H = ρ̄L , θ(t) is decreasing (increasing) in t ∈ (0, +∞) if and only if ρ̄H0 ≤ ρ̄L0
(ρ̄H0 ≥ ρ̄L0 ).

1.11. Appendix 4: Alternative Assumptions on Buyers’ Entry and Exit
In the model, I make a simplifying assumption with respect to buyers’ entry and exit.
Namely, the inflow of buyers is proportional to the mass of sellers at any given time, and
buyers exit the market immediately if no trade happens within matches. This assumption
helps me highlight the effect of buyers’ trading strategy on market liquidity without considering the changes in the meeting rate. Here I analyze the robustness of the main results
in a model with more conventional assumptions on buyers’ entry and exit.
Let’s consider a market with a fixed inflow of buyers denoted by . After unsuccessful trade,
buyers do not exit the market. Instead, they stay on the market and are matched randomly
with sellers. Denote the mass of buyers at time t by mB (t). The matching function takes

 S
(t) + mLS (t) . Therefore, each seller meets a buyer at
a multiplicative form of λ̂mB (t) mH

 S
(t) + mLS (t) . Since
Poisson rate λ̂mB (t), and each buyer meets a seller at Poisson rate λ̂ mH
the matching process is random, the prior belief of a seller—the probability of meeting a
high-quality seller to the probability of meeting a low-quality seller—is still θ(t). Compared
to the model described in Section 1.2, the market liquidity is affected by both the endogenous
meeting rate and buyers’ trading strategy. In addition, buyers now take into consideration
the option value of waiting to buy assets later. Both factors complicate the analysis of the
model, especially the analytical characterization of the non-stationary equilibria.
To characterize the equilibrium in the revised model, we need to introduce more notations.
Let Ĵ(t) be the ex ante expected value of a matched buyer and J(t) be the continuation

46

value of an unmatched buyer at time t. They are linked through the following expression.
Z
J(t) =

+∞



Rτ
S
e −r (τ −t) Ĵ(τ )d 1 − e − t λm (t)du .

t

The continuation values CH (t), VH (t) and VL (t) still satisfy (1.3), (1.5) and (1.6), while
CL (t) is different because the matching function is different.
Z
CL (t) =

∞h

i
Rτ B
(1 − e −r (τ −t) )cL + e −r (τ −t) cH d(1 − e −λ t m (u)γL (cH ,u)du ).

t

For the static trading game, the previous analyses still apply if we replace the continuation
values with ĈH (t) = CH (t), ĈL (t) = CL (t), V̂H (t) = VH (t) − J(t) and V̂L (t) = VL (t) − J(t).
n
o
Let ν(t) = min V̂L (t), ĈL (t) , the expected value of being matching at time t is

Ĵ(t) − J(t) =






















V̂L (t) − ν(t) ,

θ(t) < θ̂− (k, ν(t)),
h
i
1
G
B
1+θ(t) V̂L (t) − fL ĈH (t) − fL ν(t) ...


θ(t)
+ 1+θ(t)
θ− (k, ν(t)) ≤ θ(t) < θ+ (k, ν(t)),
fHG V̂H (t) − ĈH (t) − k,




θ(t)
1
+
1+θ(t) V̂L (t) − ĈH (t) + 1+θ(t) V̂H (t) − ĈH (t) , θ(t) ≥ θ (k, ν(t)).
1
1+θ(t)

Although the characterization is more complicated, the main result still holds—given certain
parametric restrictions, there exists two steady states, a liquid one without information
acquisition and an illiquid one with information acquisition. Moreover, given the initial
condition in the illiquid steady state, there is no equilibrium that converges to the liquid
steady state. Here I provide the intuition without giving the details of the analysis. First,
since the static trading game can be represented with a set of modified continuation values,
the equilibrium of the static trading game does not change qualitatively. Specifically, the
information-sensitive region lies to the left of the information-insensitive pooling region.
Second, when buyers acquire information, high-quality assets are still traded faster than
low-quality assets. Therefore, the cream-skimming effect of information acquisition is still
present in the revised model. Third, although the rate at which sellers meet buyers is higher
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in an illiquid market, it does not offset the low liquidity caused by buyers’ information
acquisition. To summarize, the above three components that drive the main results are all
present in the revised model.

1.12. Appendix 5: Non-Stationary Equilibria from the Information Trap
The following proposition shows that when the current market composition falls in the
overlapping part of the two information-sensitive region [θ2− (k), θ1+ (k)], it is hard for the
market to recover to the liquid state S1 , even if an information-insensitive pooling stationary
equilibria exists for the same set of parameters and fundamental α.
Proposition 1.6. If θ2− (k) ≤ θ(0) < θ1+ (k), there exists an equilibrium path that converges
to pooling trading if and only if the dynamics of the asset distribution characterized by (1.10)
and (1.11) with ρH (t) ≡ fHG and ρL (t) ≡ fLG satisfy θ(t) = θ1+ (k) for some t ≥ 0.

1.13. Appendix 6: Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1.1-1.3 (Solutions to the Static Trading Game). VL < CL , no gains from
trade for low-quality assets. The buyer has lower continuation value of the low-quality
asset than the seller. Therefore, no trade will take place at any price lower than CH .
The buyer will compare the expected payoff from offering the lowest pooling price and
withdrawing from trading (or offering a price lower than VL ). The buyer finds it optimal
to offer the pooling price CH if and only if

θ̃VH + VL − (1 + θ̃)CH ≥ 0.

It can be written as

θ̃ ≥ θ̂ =

CH − VL
.
VH − CH

where θ̂ is the threshold belief.
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(1.37)

If the prior belief θ ≥ θ̂, the optimal strategy of a buyer without information is to offer the
lowest pooling offer CH and get the expected revenue

θ
1+θ VH

1
+ 1+θ
VL − CH . However, when

observing the signal, the buyer can make offers conditional on the signal. Specifically, if
θ ≥ θ̂ and θ̃(θ, B) ≤ θ̂, the buyer will offer pooling price CH when observing G and withdraw
from trade if observing B. The expected revenue is

θ
G
1+θ fH (VH

− CH ) +

1
G
1+θ fL (VL

− CH ).

If θ̃(θ, B) > θ̂, the buyer is willing to offer the pooling price CH no matter what the signal
is. The expected revenue is

θ
1+θ VH

+

1
1+θ VL

− CH , the same as if there’s no information.

Therefore, the value of information for the buyer can be written in the form of an option
value

1 B
θ
B
f (VH − CH ) +
f (CH − VL ), 0 .
W (θ) = max −
1+θ H
1+θ L


The intuition is as following. For prior belief θ ≥ θ̂, the signal allow the buyer to avoid loss
CH − VL from buying a low-quality asset with probability
be “false negative” with probability

θ
B
1+θ fH

1
B
1+θ fL .

However the signal can

and by making conditional offers the buyer loses

the trade surplus VH − CH from buying a high-quality asset.
On the other hand, if θ < θ̂, there will be no trade for both types if there’s no information.
Therefore, using the same reasoning as above, we find the value of information for the buyer
is

W (θ) = max


θ
1 G
G
f (VH − CH ) −
f (CH − VL ), 0 .
1+θ H
1+θ L

After observing the signal, the buyer has the option to make conditional offers. Doing so,
the buyer gains the surplus of trading with the high type with probability
a loss of trading with the low type with probability

1
G
1+θ fL .

θ
G
1+θ fH ,

but incurs

The buyer will make conditional

offers only if the net gain is positive.

VL ≥ CL , non-negative gains from trade for low-quality assets. There’s a nonnegative gain if the buyer offers a low price to only buy low-quality assets. Therefore, the
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buyer compares the expected gain from offering a pooling price with only buying low-quality
assets. The buyer find it optimal to offer pooling price if and only if
θ̃
1
1
VH +
VL − CH ≥
(VL − CL ),
1 + θ̃
1 + θ̃
1 + θ̃
which translates into

θ̃ ≥ θ̂ =

CH − CL
.
VH − CH

If θ ≥ θ̂, the buyer will offer pooling price CH without information. By making conditional
offers, the buyer can reduce the price paid for a low-quality asset from CH to CL with
probability

θ
B
1+θ fL ,

but with probability

θ
B
1+θ fH

she will lose the revenue VH − CH from

buying a high-quality asset. The value of information to the buyer is

1 B
θ
B
f (VH − CH ) +
f (CH − CL ), 0 .
W (θ) = max −
1+θ H
1+θ L


If θ < θ̂, the buyer will only trade with the low type at price CL without information. By
making conditional offers, the buyer can get revenue of VH −CH with probability
buying a high-quality asset, while loss CH − CL with probability

1
G
1+θ fL

θ
G
1+θ fH

from

buying a low-quality

asset at the pooling price. The value of information to the buyer is therefore

W (θ) = max


θ
1 G
G
f (VH − CH ) −
f (CH − CL ), 0 .
1+θ H
1+θ L

Let ν = min {VL , CL }, the value of information can be written in a synthetic form,

W (θ) =


n

 max − θ f B (VH − CH ) +
1+θ H

 max{ θ f G (VH − CH ) −
1+θ H

1
B
1+θ fL (CH

1
G
1+θ fL (CH

o
− ν), 0 ,

− ν), 0},

if θ ≥ θ̂,
if θ < θ̂.

Notice W (θ) remains at zero for θ close to 0, then increases to its maximum value Wmax (ν) =
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CH −ν
at θ = θ̂ =
(fLB − fHB )(vH − cH ) · V
H −ν

CH −ν
VH −CH ,

and decreases to zero at a finite value of θ. For

k < Wmax (ν), the boundaries of the information-sensitive region can be solved by equating
W (θ) and k,
θ− (k, ν) =

fLG (CH − ν) + k
,
fHG (VH − CH ) − k

θ+ (k, ν) =

fLB (CH − ν) − k
.
fHB (VH − CH ) + k

Proof of Lemma 1.4. First note that

CL (t) ≤

rcL + λcH
.
r +λ

If γL (cH , τ ) ≥ fLG for any τ > t,
Z

τ

e −r (u−t) λγL (cH , u)(cH − CL (u))du,


Z τ
rcL + λcH
−r (τ −t)
−r (u−t)
G
≤(1 − e
)(vL − cL ) −
e
λfL cH −
du,
r +λ
t
Z τ
−r (τ −t)
G r (cH − cL )
=(1 − e
)(vL − cL ) − λfL
e −r (u−t) du,
r +λ
t


λ
−r (τ −t)
G
=(1 − e
)(vL − cL ) vL − cL − fL
(cH − cL ) .
r +λ
(1 − e

−r (τ −t)

)(vL − cL ) −

t

If Assumption 1.1 holds, the above expression is negative for any τ > t. Therefore VL (t) −
CL (t) < 0.

Proof of Prosposition 1.1. Since fLG < fHG and fLB > fHB , the interval defined in Lemma 1.6
has positive measure for small k. Also, when k is small, the condition for the existence of
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S1 becomes

α≥

fLB (cH − V̄L,1 ) − k
.
fHB (VH − cH ) + k

Lemma 1.5 and 1.6 jointly imply that S1 and S2 coexist if and only if α ∈ [A1 (k), A2 (k)].
To show the interval has positive measure for small k, it’s sufficient to show that
fLB (cH − V̄L,1 )
δ + λfHG fLB (cH − V̄L,2 )
<
·
.
fHB (VH − cH )
δ + λfLG fHB (VH − cH )
In fact, the above inequality always holds since V̄L,1 > V̄L,2 and fLG > fLG .

Proof of Lemma 1.10. When ρH (t) and ρL (t) are constants, they can be further simplified
as


δα
δα
S
+ mH (0) −
e −(δ+λρH )t ,
=
δ + λρH
δ + λρH


δ(1 − α)
δ(1 − α)
S
S
mL (t) =
+ mL (0) −
e −(δ+λρL )t
δ + λρL
δ + λρL

S
mH
(t)

Plugging in (1.38) and (1.39), we can show that the sign of
(δ + λρ̄H0 ) − (δ + λρ̄H )
1 + (δ +

(δ+λρ̄H )t −1
λρ̄H0 ) e δ+λρ̄
H

Note that for any t > 0 the function

x−y
yt
1+x e y−1

−

dθ(t)
dt

(1.39)

is the same as the sign of

(δ + λρ̄L0 ) − (δ + λρ̄L )
1 + (δ + λρ̄L0 ) e

(1.38)

(δ+λρ̄L )t −1

.

(1.40)

δ+λρ̄L

is strictly increasing in x and strictly decreasing

in y for any y ≤ x. Thus, if ρ̄L0 ≥ ρ̄H0 ≥ ρ̄H ≥ ρ̄L (ρ̄H0 ≥ ρ̄L0 ≥ ρ̄L ≥ ρ̄H ), (1.40) is nonpositive (non-negative), which implies θ(t) is decreasing (increasing) in t. Similarly, if
ρ̄H = ρ̄L , the sign of (1.40) is the same as the sign of ρ̄H0 − ρ̄L0 . Therefore, θ(t) is decreasing
(increasing) in t if and only if ρ̄H0 ≤ ρ̄L0 (ρ̄H0 ≥ ρ̄L0 ).
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Proof of Proposition 1.2. Notice

A2 (k) =

δ + λfHG
δ + λfHG +
·
θ
(k,
V̄
)
=
· A3 (k) > A3 (k).
L,2
δ + λfLG
δ + λfLG

(1.41)

A1 (k) is the maximum of two values. By Lemma 1.3 we know θ+ (k, V̄L,2 ) > θ+ (k, V̄L,1 ). To
show that θ+ (k, V̄L,2 ) > A1 (k) for small enough k, it is sufficient to show that
fLB (cH − V̄L,2 )
δ + λfHG fLG (cH − V̄L,2 )
>
·
.
fHB (VH − cH )
δ + λfLG fHG (VH − cH )

(1.42)

It follows directly from fLB > fHB and fHG > fLG .
Given any α ∈ (A1 (k), A3 (k)), the no information pooling stationary equilibria features
θ̄1 = α > θ+ (k, V̄L,1 ). Suppose the market starts from an initial asset distribution with θ(0)
in the neighbourhood of α. Let’s consider two paths. On the first path buyers always offer
the pooling price cH without acquiring information. Therefore, ρH (t) = ρL (t) = 1. Lemma
1.10 implies that θ(t) converges monotonically to α. Since the continuation values are the
same as in the no information pooling stationary equilibria, it is easy to verify that θ(t) falls
in the pooling no information region for any t > 0. The first path is indeed an equilibrium
path converging to S1 .
For the second path, assume buyers always acquire information and offer the pooling price
cH only if a good signal is observed. Thus, the continuation values are the same as in the
information stationary equilibria. Moreover, ρH (t) = fHG and ρL (t) = fLG for any t > 0.
Lemma 1.10 implies that starting from the initial distribution close to S1 , θ(t) decreases
monotonically to θ̄2 . Notice by assumption
θ(0) = α < A3 (k) = θ+ (k, V̄L,2 ),
θ̄(+∞) =

δ + λfLG
δ + λfLG
·
α
≥
· A1 (k) ≥ θ̄− (k, V̄L,2 ).
δ + λfHG
δ + λfHG

The whole path of θ(t) lies within the information sensitive region. Since θ̄2 is the only sink
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in the information region, when starting from an initial distribution close to that of S1 , the
path of θ(t) also stays in the information sensitive region. Therefore, the second path is an
equilibrium path converging to S2 .

Proof of Proposition 1.3. Assume buyers do not acquire information and always offer the
pooling price cH for any t > 0. Therefore, both high-quality and low-quality assets are
traded with probability 1. Also, the continuation values of owners of low-quality assets
are fixed at VL (t) = V̄L,1 and CL (t) = C̄L,1 . To show the assumed path is indeed an
equilibrium path, we only need to verify that the whole path of market composition falls
in the pooling information-insensitive region. In fact, Lemma 1.10 implies that the market
composition θ(t) increases monotonically from θ(0) to α. Given that α, θ(0) > θ1+ (k), we
know θ(t) > θ1+ (k) for any t > 0. The assumed path is an equilibrium path that converges
to S1 .

Proof of Proposition 1.6. First, we prove a lemma that characterizes any equilibrium path
that converges to pooling trading.

Lemma 1.11. If

δ+λfLG
δ+λfHG

α ≤ θ+ (k, V̄L,1 ), along any equilibrium path that converges to pooling

trading, θ(t) must be weakly increasing whenever θ(t) < θ+ (k, V̄L,1 ).
Proof of Lemma 1.11. This can be proved by contradiction. Suppose there exist t1 such
that θ̇(t1 ) < 0 and θ(t1 ) < θ+ (k, V̄L,1 ). By continuity of θ(t), there exists t3 > t2 ≥ t1 such
that θ̇(t2 ) < 0, θ(t) < θ+ (k, V̄L,1 ) for any t2 ≤ t < t3 and θ(t) ≥ θ+ (k, V̄L,1 ) for any t ≥ t3 .
Namely, t3 is the last time that θ(t) enters the region θ ≥ θ+ (k, V̄L,1 ) from the left. θ(t)
decreases at t2 and stays below θ+ (k, V̄L,1 ) for t2 < t < t3 .
Since θ(t) > θ+ (k, V̄L,1 ) for any t > t3 , using backward induction, we can show that
CL (t3 ) > VL (t3 ) = V̄L,1 . For t slightly less than t3 , θ− (k, V̄L,1 ) < θ(t) < θ+ (k, V̄L,1 ),
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therefore, buyers acquire information and only offers the pooling price when signal G is
observed. So ρH (t) = fHG and ρL (t) = fLG . Since θ(t) crosses θ+ (k, V̄L,1 ) from the left, for t
slightly less than t3 , we have
d
δα
ln θ(t) = S
(1 − θ(t)/α) − λ(fHG − fLG ) > 0,
dt
mH (t)(1 + α)

(1.43)

Taking the limit of t to t3 , it yields
δα
S (t )(1
mH
3

+ α)


1 − θ+ (k, V̄L,1 )/α − λ(fHG − fLG ) ≥ 0.

(1.44)

Evaluating the derivative of θ(t) at t = t2 , we have
δα
S (t )(1
mH
2

+ α)

(1 − θ(t2 )/α) − λ(ρH (t2 ) − ρL (t2 )) < 0.

(1.45)

By construction, θ(t2 ) < θ+ (k, V̄L,1 ) < α. Also notice ρH (t2 )−ρL (t2 ) < fHG −fLG . Comparing
(1.44) and (1.45), we have

S
S
mH
(t2 ) > mH
(t3 ).

On the other hand, since θ+ (k, V̄L,1 ) ≥

S
mH
(t3 ) ≤

δ+λfLG
δ+fHG

(1.46)

α, from (1.44) we know

δα 1 − θ+ (k, V̄L,1 )/α
δ
α
≤
.
G
G
G
1+α
λ(fH − fL )
δ + λfH 1 + α

Rewrite (1.10),
d
dt


S
mH
(t) −

δ
α
G
1
+
α
δ + λfH


= −(δ +

λfHG )



S
mH
(t)

δ
α
−
G
1
+
α
δ + λfH





S
− λ ρH (t) − fHG mH
(t).
(1.47)
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Since θ(t) < θ+ (k, V̄L,1 ) for t2 ≤ t < t3 , from Table 1 we know ρH (t) ≤ fHG . Therefore
d
dt



S
mH
(t)

δ
α
−
G
δ + λfH 1 + α


≥ −(δ +

λfHG )


S
mH
(t) −

δ
α
G
δ + λfH 1 + α


,

(1.48)

or equivalently
d
d(−t)






δ
α
δ
α
S
G
S
− mH (t) ≥ (δ + λfH )
− mH (t) ,
δ + λfHG 1 + α
δ + λfHG 1 + α

S (t ) ≤
Given mH
3

δ
α
,
δ+λfHG 1+α

(1.49)

S (t ) ≤ mS (t ). This is in contradiction
(1.49) implies that mH
2
H 3

with (1.46). Therefore, θ(t) must be weakly increasing when θ(t) < θ+ (k, V̄L,1 ) along any
equilibrium path that converges to pooling trading.

Now we can move on to prove the necessity of the given condition. Notice, if
θ(k, V̄L,1 ), the path with constant ρH (t) = fHG and ρL (t) = fLG converges to
θ(k, V̄L,1 ) in the end. On the other hand, if

δ+λfLG
δ+λfHG

δ+λfLG
α
δ+λfHG
δ+λfLG
α
δ+λfHG

>
>

α ≤ θ(k, V̄L,1 ), Lemma 1.11 indicates

that any path that starts from θ(0) < θ(k, V̄L,1 ) and converges to pooling trading only
crosses θ+ (k, V̄L,1 ) once. Again, let t3 be the earliest time such that θ(t3 ) = θ+ (k, V̄L,1 ).
For any 0 ≤ t < t3 , we must have θ− (k, V̄L,2 ) ≤ θ(0) ≤ θ(t) < θ+ (k, V̄L,1 ). Using backward
induction, it can be easily shown that V̄L,1 < VL (t) < V̄L,2 for any 0 ≤ t < t3 . Therefore,
from the monotonicity of θ− (k, ·) and θ+ (k, ·) we know that θ− (k, VL (t)) < θ− (k, VL,2 ) <
θ(t) < θ+ (k, V̄L,1 ) < θ+ (k, VL (t)) for any 0 ≤ t < t3 . Also, Assumption 1.1 implies that
VL (t) < CL (t) for any t ≥ 0. Referring to Table 1, we know buyers acquire information
with probability 1, ρH (t) = fHG , ρL (t) = fLG for any 0 ≤ t < t3 . This shows that if we fix
ρH (t) = fHG and ρL (t) = fLG for any t ≥ 0, we must have θ(t3 ) = θ+ (k, V̄L,1 ).
Now we want to show the given condition is also sufficient. This is done by guess-and-verify.
Let t3 be the first positive value that satisfies θ(t) = θ(k, V̄L,1 ) in the hypothetical path
with ρH (t) ≡ fLG and ρL (t) ≡ fLG . Let i(t) = 1 and σ(cH , G , t) = 1 for any t < t3 and i = 0,
σ(cH , N, t) = 1 for any t ≥ t3 . It is easy to construct an equilibrium path that’s consistent
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with the above offering strategy.

Proof of Proposition 1.4. Since V̄L,1 > V̄L,2 , by Lemma 1.3, θ+ (k, V̄L,1 ) < θ+ (k, V̄L,2 ), therefore A4 (k) < A2 (k). Also, Assumption 1.2 implies that θ− (k, V̄L,2 ) < θ+ (k, V̄L,1 ). It immediately follows that A1 (k) < A4 (k) for small k > 0. By Proposition 1.1, we know when k is
small, for any α ∈ (A1 (k), A4 (k)), S1 and S2 coexist. Moreover, the market composition in
the information stationary equilibria S2 satisfies
θ− (k, V̄L,2 ) < θ̄2 < θ+ (k, V̄L,1 ).

Therefore, the asset distribution in S2 falls in the information trap. By Proposition 1.6,
when the asset distribution is in the neighbourhood of S2 , there’s no equilibrium path that
converges to S1 .

Proof of Proposition 1.5. It is a direct implication of the monotonicity of θ1+ (k) and A4 (k).
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CHAPTER 2 : Intervention with Screening in Global Games
Lin Shen

Junyuan Zou1

2

2.1. Introduction
In many economic environments, strategic complementarities among agents can give rise to
coordination failure.3 To reduce the welfare loss from coordination failure, policy makers
may intervene by providing incentives for agents to play the socially desirable equilibrium.
For instance, during the recent financial crisis, governments around the world provided explicit and implicit guarantees on debt obligations of financial institutions to prevent “runs”
on the financial systems. While these policies proved to be effective in restoring financial
stability, some drawbacks also emerged. First, implementing guarantee programs at such
large scale exposes the policy maker to large costs, which jeopardized sovereign debt sustainability and led to the sovereign debt crisis in many European countries (Acharya et al.,
2014; Farhi and Tirole, 2016). Second, the policies were criticized for their vulnerability
to moral hazard problems (Kareken and Wallace, 1978; Keeley, 1990; Cooper and Ross,
2002).4
Given that such large-scale interventions are costly, a natural question is whether it is possible to reduce the size of intervention programs without compromising the effectiveness. To
answer this question in a general context, we consider a coordination game with incomplete
information as in standard global games (Morris and Shin, 2003). When agents receive pri1

We are indebted to Itay Goldstein and Doron Levit for their guidance in the process. We are grateful
to Christopher Bertsch (discussant), Philip Bond, Matthieu Bouvard (discussant), Vincent Glode, Chong
Huang, Benjamin Lester, George Mailath, Stephen Morris, Christian Opp, Guillermo Ordonez, Andrew
Postlewaite, Jun Qian, Xavier Vives, as well as seminar and conference participants in the Wharton Finance
Seminar, INSEAD Finance Seminar, the FIRS 2017 Meeting, the WFA 2017 Meeting, the FTG Summer
School 2017, and the 2017 Lisbon Meeting of Game Theory and Applications for useful comments. All errors
are our own.
2
Lin Shen, Finance Department, the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 3620 Locust Walk,
Philadelphia, PA 19104, shenlin@wharton.upenn.edu.
3
Examples of coordination failures include but not limited to bank run (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983),
currency attack (Obstfeld, 1996), macroeconomic coordination failure (Cooper and John, 1988) and technological development (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995).
4
Allen et al. (2017) endogenizes the effect of government guarantees on banks’ excessive risk taking and
shows that guarantees are overall welfare improving even with moral hazard problems.
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vate signals, they form interim beliefs regarding the expected payoffs from taking different
actions. We propose a group of programs with voluntary participation that screen agents
based on their interim beliefs. Compared with the conventional government-guarantee type
of programs, it has two main advantages. First, in equilibrium, only a small group of
marginal investors self-select into the program, which reduces the implementation costs.
Also, our proposed programs have the advantage that moral hazard problems are limited
to the small group of participating agents.
This paper provides novel insights for the design of intervention policies to reduce coordination failure in various economic contexts. Some existing literature (Sakovics and Steiner,
2012; Choi, 2014) has studied policies that target ex-ante important agents based on their
payoff functions. We contribute to this literature by highlighting the role of agents’ interim
beliefs of the economic fundamental and other agents’ actions. If an ex-ante important agent
is very optimistic about the coordination result, there’s no need to provide extra incentives
for her to take the socially desirable action. It is more cost-efficient if the resources are
allocated to agents who have medium beliefs and are at the margin of taking the socially
desirable action.
In our benchmark model, we explore a canonical binary-action coordination game under
the global games framework. Global games are useful for linking coordination outcome to
the underlying fundamental and determining the unique equilibrium. More importantly,
they highlight the strategic interactions of agents with heterogeneous private information.
In the model, a continuum of agents is each endowed with an investment opportunity.
Their investments feature strategic complementarities. Specifically, the investments are
successful if and only if the mass of agents investing exceeds a threshold which decreases in
the fundamental of the economy. In addition, each agent receives a noisy private signal of
the fundamental and makes inferences about the other agents’ investment decisions. The
game has a unique equilibrium where all agents follow the same threshold strategy. In
terms of welfare, there exists a region of weak fundamentals in which agents do not invest,
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however, the investments would have been successful if all agents were to invest. Therefore,
social welfare will be improved if the policy maker can lower the investment threshold and
reduce the coordination failure region. The setup of the model is fairly general such that
it can be applied to various economic contexts. In section 6, we discuss three coordination
problems and make policy recommendations based on the proposed intervention policy.
Next, we allow the policy maker to offer a subsidy-tax program with voluntary participation to all agents who invest. If an investor accepts the offer, she receives a direct subsidy.
In return, she is required to pay tax when the investment is successful. We classified the
intervention programs into three categories based on the subsidy-to-tax ratio. If a program
is too austere, i.e. has a low subsidy-to-tax ratio, no agents will participate. We call this
type of programs the zero-participation programs. If a program is too generous such that
all investors participate, we call it a full-participation program. Many existing intervention
policies, including government guarantees and direct subsidies, benefit all agents uniformly
and therefore fall into this category. We show that full-participation programs can effectively reduce coordination failure, however, are costly to implement. To reduce the costs
of implementation, we propose partial-participation programs with medium subsidy-to-tax
ratios. A partial participation program is equivalent to a costly insurance policy and screens
agents based on their interim belief of success. The most optimistic investors who believe
in a high probability of paying the tax do not take the offer. At the same time, the most
pessimistic agents who believe in a high probability of coordination failure do not find it
worthwhile to invest solely to take advantage of the offer. Only agents with intermediate beliefs will participate in the program since it provides protection against coordination
failure and investment loss. We show that with a partial-participation program there is a
unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium, in which all agents follow the same threshold strategy
with two thresholds. An agent will invest and reject the offer if she receives a high signal;
she will invest and accept the offer if her signal is medium and between the two thresholds;
she will not invest if she receives a low signal. When the information friction goes to zero,
the two thresholds converge, and the expected mass of agents who accept the offer goes to
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zero, which implies zero expected cost of implementation for the policy maker. Furthermore, with proper choice of subsidy and tax, coordination failures can be eliminated, and
the first-best investment threshold can be achieved.
To understand intuitively how partial-participation programs can improve coordination results at a minimal cost, let us start with the original threshold equilibrium without intervention programs. For agents receiving signals right below the investment threshold, without
any intervention policy, they will not invest in fear of coordination failure and investment
loss. The partial-participation programs provide protection against investment loss and
give them extra incentive to make the investment. Therefore, with the partial-participation
programs, all agents rationally expect the mass of agents who invest to increase and the
strategic complementarities strengthen all agents’ incentive to invest. Hence, agents receiving even lower signals would be willing to accept the offer and invest, which is also
expected by all agents in the economy and gives them more incentive to invest. Repeating the thought process, the extra incentive to invest provided by the partial-participation
programs is amplified by higher-order beliefs, and the investment threshold can be reduced
significantly in equilibrium. Given that all agents are more optimistic and less worried
about coordination failure, the downside protection of the partial-participation programs
becomes less appealing, and the mass of investors who accept the offer in equilibrium is
actually small.
We then compare government guarantee programs with partial-participation programs in
the presence of moral hazard problems. Government guarantee programs are a special case
of full-participation programs and have been widely used to reduce coordination failure.
We extend the benchmark model by assuming that after investment, an investor can earn
private benefit by shirking, which will reduce the success probability of her own investment.
Both types of intervention programs reduce investors’ “skin in the game” hence induce
shirking at the expense of the policy maker and social welfare. For example, in the context
of credit freeze when banks abstain from lending, government guarantees reduce banks’
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incentive to screen and monitor borrowers. Moral hazard problem critically limits the scale
of the government-guarantee type of programs. Specifically, if a government guarantees a
large amount of investment losses, all investors, including the most optimistic ones, would
participate and shirk. In contrast, for partial-participation programs, the moral hazard
problem is limited to the program participants. For the optimistic agents, rejecting the
offer and exerting effort gives higher payoff than participating and shirking. Hence, the
social welfare loss only incurs for medium-belief agents, the mass of whom goes to zero in
the limit of vanishing information frictions. As a result, in the limit, there exist partialparticipation programs that can restore the first best, yet no government-guarantee type of
programs can restore the first best.
Besides the benchmark model, we also show that the results could be generalized to allow
unobservable ex-ante heterogeneity in agents’ payoff and information structure. Regarding
ex-ante agent heterogeneity, a closely related paper is Sakovics and Steiner (2012). The
difference is that they only allow the policy maker to provide direct subsidies conditional
on agents’ observable heterogeneities. Under their setup, the most cost-efficient subsidies
should target the important agents with specific ex-ante characteristics. However, their
policy space falls into the category of full-participation programs in our model, and the
policy maker can save costs and limit moral hazard problems by switching to a partialparticipation program. In other words, we show that subsidization should target the interim
rather than ex-ante “pivotal” types. Moreover, since the “pivotal” agents self-select to
participate in partial-participation programs, the policy maker does not need to observe
agents’ ex-ante characteristics. We also show that the binary payoff structure in the baseline
model can be generalized to a continuous monotonic payoff function.
Our paper is related to two lines of literature. First, our model is built on the literature of
global games which was pioneered by Carlsson and Van Damme (1993). Researchers have
applied the global games techniques to analyze coordination failures in different contexts,
to name a few, bank runs (Rochet and Vives, 2004; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005), currency
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attack (Morris and Shin, 1998), credit freeze (Bebchuk and Goldstein, 2011), debt rollovers
(Morris and Shin, 2004; He and Xiong, 2012), and political revolutions (Edmond, 2013).
We take a general approach and propose intervention programs that can be applied to
reduce coordination failure in different contexts. Morris and Shin (2003) reviews the most
commonly applied setup and applications of global games. Our main model in section 2 is
a special case with binary payoffs. In section 5, we discuss a generalized payoff structure
as in Morris and Shin (2003). In both cases, we show that there exists costless intervention
to reduce the coordination threshold and eliminate coordination failures in the limit of zero
information friction.
Second, our mechanism shares similar ideas found in the literature that explores policies
targeting a specific group of agents to reduce coordination failures. For example, within
the contracting literature, Segal (2003) and Bernstein and Winter (2012) show that the
optimal policy is to divide and conquer, i.e. subsidize a subset of players so that they invest
even if no one else invests, then the surplus of players in the no-subsidy set can be fully
extracted. Sakovics and Steiner (2012) and Choi (2014) analyzed a coordination game with
ex-ante heterogeneous agents and showed that different types should be subsidized in a
certain order. These papers all demonstrate that subsidizing a subset of agents to ensure
their participation can efficiently encourage the participation of the rest of the agents and
reduce coordination failure. Our proposed intervention program is different in terms of
implementation. The policy maker offers the same option to all agents, and a subset of
agents self-select to participate in the program. In the generalization of unobservable exante heterogeneity, we show that our proposed intervention program is more cost-efficient
and does not require information about agents’ heterogeneity. Cong et al. (2017) and Basak
and Zhou (2017) analyze intervention policies under dynamic settings. In both papers, the
policy maker target a subset of agents in each period. The coordination result of the current
period serves as a public signal of the fundamental of the economy. They emphasize the
effect of the public signal on agents’ beliefs and behaviors in the subsequent period(s).
Another closely related paper is Morris and Shadmehr (2017), which analyzes the reward
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schemes for a revolutionary leader to elicit effort from citizens. The optimal reward scheme
also screens citizens for their optimism. However, they consider bounded reward schemes
imposed on a continuous and unbounded effort choice set, while we focus on subsidy-tax
programs that agents can voluntarily choose to participate in. More importantly, while
they assume zero cost for implementing any reward scheme, we target minimizing the cost
of intervention.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a benchmark model
of a binary-action investment game and introduce intervention policies that can reduce
coordination failures. Section 3 and 4 compare the proposed program with governmentguarantee type of programs in terms of implementation cost and robustness to moral hazard
problems. Two extensions of the benchmark model are discussed in section 5. Section 6
presents several applications of the benchmark model and discusses policy recommendations
in each context. Finally, section 7 concludes.

2.2. The Benchmark Model
In this section, we analyze a binary-action investment game in which each agent’s investment
outcome depends on the aggregate investment in the economy. In such an environment,
inefficient coordination failure can arise in which agents abstain from investment because
of their self-fulfilling expectation that other agents will not invest. Then we introduce
intervention policies and show how they can encourage investment and reduce coordination
failure.
2.2.1. Setups
There is a unit mass of ex-ante identical infinitesimal agents, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. These
agents are endowed with the same investment opportunity, and they simultaneously make
investment decisions ai ∈ {0, 1}. ai = 1 if agent i invests, and ai = 0 if agent i does not
invest. Not investing results in zero payoffs, while investing incurs a fixed cost c > 0 and
generates a profit of b > c if agent i’s project is successful and 0 if it fails. We assume all
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agents’ investment payoffs are perfectly correlated. The investments would be successful
when the fundamentals of the economy are strong enough or a sufficient number of agents
invest. Specifically, the payoff from an investment project is

π(θ, l) =

where l =

R1
0



 b − c,

if l ≥ 1 − θ,


 −c,

if l < 1 − θ.

ai di represents the fraction of investors or the aggregate investment level,

and θ stands for the fundamentals of the economy. Note that agents’ investment decisions
feature strategic complementarities, because each project is more likely to succeed when
more agents choose to invest. When the fundamentals are higher, it requires less aggregate
investment to make the projects successful. Without information friction, when θ ∈ [0, 1),
all agents investing (l = 1) and all agents not investing (l = 0) are both Nash equilibria.
However, all agents investing is strictly more efficient than the other equilibrium. Therefore,
the first-best outcome is that all agents coordinate to invest when θ ≥ 0 and not to invest
when θ < 0.
We follow the standard global games setup and assume the following information structure.
The fundamental θ is drawn from a uniform distribution with support [θ, θ̄] and it is not
directly observable to the agents when they make investment decisions.5 Instead, each
agent receives a noisy signal about the fundamental xi = θ + σεi , where εi is identically
and independently distributed with a continuous and strictly increasing c.d.f. F (ε), the
support of which is [− 21 , 21 ]. Furthermore, we assume that θ < −σ and θ̄ > 1 + σ. Under
this assumption, there exist two dominance regions of signals, [−θ − 21 σ, x) and (x̄, θ̄ + 12 σ],
with x and x̄ defined as
c
,
b
c
Pr (θ ≥ 0|x = x) = .
b
Pr (θ ≥ 1|x = x̄) =

5

We assume a uniform prior to obtain an analytical solution to the coordination game. This is without
loss of generality since it can be viewed as a limiting case as the size of the information friction goes to zero.
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Intuitively, with the lowest aggregate investment level l = 0, an agent is indifferent between
the two actions when she receives signal x̄. Therefore, her dominant strategy when signal
x > x̄ is to invest. Similarly, with the highest aggregate investment level l = 1, an agent
is indifferent between the two actions if she observes signal x. Hence, when x < x, not
investing is the dominant strategy.
2.2.2. Equilibrium without Intervention
In this subsection, we analyze the equilibrium without intervention and identify the inefficiencies due to coordination failure. Proposition 2.1 characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 2.1. Without intervention, there is a unique equilibrium in which all agents
follow the same strategy

ai (xi ) =

where ξ0∗ =

c
b

+ σF −1

c
b





 1,

if xi ≥ ξ0∗ ,


 0,

if xi < ξ0∗ .

.

Since there is a continuum of agents, given the realization of fundamentals θ, we can apply
the law of large numbers to calculate the aggregate investment l and predict the coordination outcomes. In equilibrium, all agents follow the same threshold strategy. Therefore,
the coordination outcome also has a threshold above which the investment projects are
successful. Let θ∗ (ξ) denote the fundamental threshold when all agents follow the threshold
strategy ξ, then it is defined by

F

θ∗ (ξ) − ξ
σ



= 1 − θ∗ (ξ).

In words, at the fundamental threshold, the fraction of investors l equals the cutoff 1 − θ.
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Then the fundamental threshold in equilibrium is given by
θ∗ (ξ0∗ ) =

c
.
b

The fundamental realizations can be divided into three regions as shown below. In the
Efficient No Investment

Inefficient Coordination Failure

Efficient Investment

θ∗ (ξ0∗ ) =

0

c
b

θ

Figure 5: Coordination Results


middle region θ ∈ 0, bc , if all agents coordinate to invest, the investment projects would
have been successful. However, the agents have self-fulfilling beliefs that other agents do not
invest. As a result, they rationally choose not to invest. Since a unit of successful investment
generates a positive surplus of b −c, in the middle region, coordination failure leads to social
welfare loss of b − c. Hence, the first-best scenario has a fundamental threshold θ∗ equal
to zero. And in the next section, we will show how our proposed intervention program can
lower this cutoff and reduce inefficiencies caused by coordination failure.
2.2.3. Intervention Program
Having characterized the equilibrium in the game without intervention, we now describe
the subsidy-tax intervention program that the policy maker can use to boost investment
and reduce coordination failure. The intervention program consists of two parts, a direct
subsidy s ∈ [0, c] and a contingent tax t ∈ [0, b). Specifically, if an investor decides to accept
the offer, she receives an upfront subsidy s regardless of the investment outcome and pays
a lump-sum tax t only if the investment succeeds.6 The program is only available to the
investors and they voluntarily decide whether to participate in the program. Note that there
is an implicit assumption that the actions taken by the agents are observable to the policy
maker and can be contracted on. We make this assumption because, as shown in Bond
6
Since in the benchmark model there’s only two possible payoffs from investing, we only need to specify
a contingent lump-sum tax. In section 2.5.2, we analyze a more general setup where there’s a continuum of
investment outcomes and we allow tax to be proportional to the investment revenue.
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and Pande (2007), if the policy maker cannot observe individual actions, its ability to use
subsidy-tax schemes as a coordination device is greatly limited. This assumption imposes
certain limitations on the application of our proposed intervention mechanism. For example,
in the context of currency attack, it is hard to trace agents’ action and tax conditional on
agents’ investment behavior. Therefore, the intervention program discussed in this paper
cannot be applied to solving currency deflation caused by coordination failure (Morris and
Shin, 1998). Despite this limitation, there is a wide range of real-world applications. In
section 6, we discuss three representative examples.
Mathematically, if an investor accepts the offer, her payoff is modified to

π̃(θ, l) =



 b − t − (c − s),

if l ≥ 1 − θ,


 −(c − s),

if l < 1 − θ.

The upfront subsidy s reduces the cost of investment and encourages agents to invest. The
contingent tax t directly helps the policy maker recover the cost of providing subsidies.
More importantly, it will become clear later that the contingent tax t indirectly saves cost
by deterring participation of optimistic agents. The timeline of the coordination game with
the intervention program is modified as follows. At the beginning of the game, the policy
maker announces the intervention program (s, t). Note that since the subsidy s and tax t are
both state independent, the announcement of the intervention program does not convey any
information possessed by the policy maker. Angeletos et al. (2003) demonstrates that the
informational role of state contingent policy can lead to multiple equilibria in global games.
Therefore, the intervention programs analyzed in this paper are free from the signaling
concern of state contingent policies and do not require the policy maker to have superior
information about the fundamentals of the economy. Then the fundamental θ is realized,
and each agent receives a noisy signal of the fundamental. After observing the signal, agents
simultaneously make their decisions on whether to invest and if so, whether to participate in
the intervention program. As soon as the decisions are made, active investors pay the cost c,
and the policy maker transfers the subsidy s to all investors participating in the intervention
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program. Then the aggregate investment l and the investment returns are realized. Finally,
the policy maker collects tax t from the investors participating in the intervention program
if the investments are successful. The timeline is summarized in Figure 6 below.
θ is realized,
agents receive
private signals
Policy maker
announces
intervention program
(s, t)

Investors incur
cost c, government
transfers s
to participators

Investment
and
participation
decisions

Government
collects tax t
from participants

Aggregate investment
l is realized and
investors receive
investment return

Figure 6: Timeline of the Investment Game

Although the intervention program is specified as a subsidy-tax program, it can be interpreted as other forms of intervention with transfers between the policy maker and the
investors, contingent on the coordination result. For example, a government-guarantee type
program that promises to cover the loss of failed investment up to s g ≤ c is equivalent to
a subsidy-tax program with s = t = s g . To see this, under both programs, the net transfer
from the government to any participating investor is 0 in the case of successful investments
and s g in the case of failed investments. Similarly, an asset purchase program in which
the policy maker buys

t
b

fraction of the project with price s is equivalent to a subsidy-tax

program (s, t).
2.2.4. Equilibrium with Intervention
We now analyze the equilibrium with intervention and demonstrate how the intervention
program works to reduce coordination failure. With the intervention program, an agent has
three choices: {a = 1, Reject}, {a = 1, Accept}, and {a = 0}. Note that although agents
make two decisions, whether to invest and conditional on investing, whether to accept the
offer, only their investment decisions affect the coordination results. Therefore, an agent
only cares about the investment decisions of the others but not their participation in the
intervention program. As a result, to analyze the best response and equilibrium strategies,
it is sufficient to condition on other agents’ investment strategies. Let p̂i = Pr[l ≥ 1 − θ|xi ]
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denote the interim belief of success of agent i given her private signal xi and other agents’
investment strategies a−i (x). The expected payoffs from {a = 1, Reject} and {a = 1, Accept}
are

E[π(θ, l)|xi ] = p̂i b − c,

(2.1)

E[π̃(θ, l)|xi ] = p̂i (b − t) − (c − s)

(2.2)

respectively. And the expected payoff from {a = 0} is zero. Figure 7 depicts the expected
payoff as a function of the interim belief p̂. It can be divided into three cases according to
the subsidy-tax ratio st . In the first case when

≥ 1, accepting the offer dominates rejecting

Eπ̃(θ, l)
Eπ(θ, l)

Eπ

0

s
t

c−s
b−t

c
b

(a) Case 1:

1

s
t

Eπ
Eπ(θ, l)
Eπ̃(θ, l)

0

p̂

c−s
b−t

≥1

c
b

(b) Case 2:

s
t

c
b

≤

1

s
t

p̂

<1

Eπ
Eπ(θ, l)
Eπ̃(θ, l)
0

s
t
c
b

(c) Case 3:

1

s
t

<

p̂

c
b

Figure 7: Expected Payoffs and Interim Beliefs
the offer. This is because investors always receive a higher subsidy s than their tax payment
required by the intervention program. We call this type of programs the full-participation
programs. Without intervention, the belief threshold for investment is the cost-benefit ratio
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c
b.

c−s
b−t .

With a full-participation program, the threshold is lowered to

with

s
t

In the third case

< bc , rejecting dominates accepting the offer. We call this type of programs the zero-

participation programs. Thus, the threshold belief under the zero-participation program
is the same as the original cost-benefit ratio
When

c
b

≤

s
t

c
b.

The second case is the most interesting.

< 1 (figure 7.b), an agent would only accept the offer and invest when she has

s
an intermediate belief p̂ ∈ [ c−s
b−t , t ]. We call this type of programs the partial-participation

programs. Notice in both case 1 and case 2, the provision of the intervention program lowers
the threshold belief to

c−s
b−t .

The difference is that, in case 2, the most optimistic agents

do not participate in the intervention program, which is cost saving especially when the
information friction is small. We will analyze the cost of the programs in detail in section
3.
Next we sketch the analyses of equilibrium with intervention. It will become clear later that
iterated deletion of dominated strategies allows us to focus on cutoff investment strategies.
We say an agent follows a cutoff investment strategy with threshold k, if her investment
strategy is

ai (x; k) =



 1,

if x ≥ k,


 0,

if x < k.

(2.3)

Let p(x; k) denote the interim belief of success when an agent receives private signal x and
all other agents follow a cutoff investment strategy k,


∗

p(x; k) = Pr (θ > θ (k)|x) = F

x − θ∗ (k)
σ


,

where θ∗ (k) is the fundamental threshold for successful investment and satisfies F

(2.4)


k−θ∗ (k)
σ



=

θ∗ (k). An agent’s interim belief of success p(x; k) increases in x and decreases in k, because
a high private signal x indicates a high realization of fundamentals θ, and a low investment
threshold k implies a high aggregate investment l. Both imply a high probability of success.
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In all three cases depicted in figure 2.3, the optimal investment strategy is that an agent
invests if and only if her belief p(x, k) exceeds a threshold. Since p(x, k) is monotonic in
both x and k, an agent’s best response to other agents’ cutoff strategy k is also a cutoff
investment strategy based on her own signal. The two dominance regions form two extreme
cutoff investment strategies. Starting there, by iterated deletion of dominated strategies,
we are able to prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium with intervention. The details of
the analyses can be found in the proof of proposition 2.2 below. The following proposition
characterizes the equilibrium with a subsidy-tax intervention program (s, t).7
Proposition 2.2. When the policy maker offers a subsidy-tax intervention program (s, t) 
0, the game has a unique equilibrium. There are three different cases,
1. When

s
t

≥ 1, the equilibrium is for any agent i,
ai = 1, Accept, if xi ≥ ξ ∗ (s, t),
ai = 0, if xi < ξ ∗ (s, t).

where
c −s
ξ (s, t) =
+ σF −1
b−t
∗

2. When

c
b

≤

s
t



c −s
b−t


,

< 1, the equilibrium is for any agent i,
ai = 1, Reject, if xi ≥ η ∗ (s, t),
ai = 1, Accept, if ξ ∗ (s, t) ≤ xi < η ∗ (s, t),
ai = 0, if xi < ξ ∗ (s, t),

7

Frankel et al. (2003) prove existence, uniqueness and monotonicity in multi-action global games. However, our setup does not satisfy the continuity assumption. Therefore, we provide our own proof in the
Appendix.
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where


c −s
−1 c − s
,
ξ (s, t) =
+ σF
b−t
b−t
s 
c −s
η ∗ (s, t) =
+ σF −1
.
b−t
t
∗

3. When

s
t

< bc , the equilibrium is for any agent i,
ai = 1, Reject, if xi ≥ ξ ∗ (s, t),
ai = 0, if xi < ξ ∗ (s, t),

where
ξ ∗ (s, t) =

c 
c
.
+ σF −1
b
b

The ratio of the upfront subsidy s and the ex-post tax t can be interpreted as the generosity
of the program. If the offer is generous (case 1), all investors find it profitable to accept the
offer and the equilibrium investment cutoff depends on the modified cost c 0 = c − s and
benefit b 0 = b − t. If the offer is austere (case 3), all investors will not be interested in the
offer. Therefore the equilibrium investment cutoff is the same as the original cutoff without
the intervention program. The most interesting case is case 2, in which the generosity of
the offer is medium. Investors with high private signals have strong beliefs in the success
of the project, so they will reject the subsidy offer since they believe in a high probability
of paying a net tax in the future. However, even without subsidies, these optimistic agents
would invest anyway. Agents with low private signals have strong beliefs in the failure of the
project, so even with the subsidy s, they still suffer a loss of c − s from investing. Therefore,
these agents would not invest regardless of the intervention program. In contrast, investors
receiving signals around the threshold do not have strong beliefs about the coordination
results. Without the intervention program, some of these agents would not invest. The
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intervention program provides insurance against losses in case of failed investment and gives
these agents extra incentive to invest. With the extra incentive, these agents’ decisions are
effectively altered and the aggregate action l therefore increases. The increase in l, in turn,
strengthens all agents’ incentive to invest. Agents with even lower signals would participate
in the program and change their decisions to invest. Through iterations of higher-order
beliefs, the action cutoff is significantly lowered. Moreover, agents with signals around the
old cutoff are significantly more optimistic, and therefore the intervention program is no
longer appealing to them. In equilibrium, the mass of investors accepting the offer is rather
small. We call these investors the “pivotal” investors, since the equilibrium investment
cutoff is determined by their modified cost and benefit.
In case 1 and 2, the fundamental cutoff above which the investment projects are successful
is
θ∗ (ξ ∗ (s, t)) =

c −s
.
b−t

(2.5)

Note that the new fundamental cutoff is lower than that without government intervention.
Therefore, the provision of the intervention program successfully reduces the inefficient
coordination failure region. If the government picks s = c and t ∈ [s, b), the fundamental
cutoff can be reduced to 0, eliminating the whole region of inefficient coordination failure
as demonstrated in Figure 8.
Inefficient
Coordination
Efficient No Investment
Failure
0

θ∗ =

Efficient Investment
θ0∗ =

c−s
b−t

c
b

θ

Figure 8: Coordination Results after Intervention

2.3. Cost of Implementation
In this section, we compare the implementation cost of partial-participation and full-participation
intervention programs in two cases, one with negligible information frictions and one with

74

non-negligible information frictions. We then discuss the intuitions why partial-participation
is more cost-efficient than full-participation programs.
2.3.1. Cost of the Intervention Programs
We compare the expected cost of the partial-participation and full-participation programs
conditional on the same target fundamental threshold θ∗ of successful investment. To allow
for the possibility that the policy maker values tax and subsidy differently, the value of tax
for the policy maker is normalized to 1 and the cost of providing subsidy is assumed to be
τ . The ex-post cost of providing the intervention program to an individual investor is

ĉ(θ, s, t) =



 τ s − t,

if l ≥ 1 − θ,


 τ s,

if l < 1 − θ.

(2.6)

When ĉ(θ, s, t) is negative, the policy maker profits from providing this intervention program.
For the rest of the analyses, we focus on τ ≥ 1 for two reasons. First, we believe it is a
realistic characterization. If subsidy is provided before tax collection, τ > 1 reflects the
funding cost of the policy maker due to the opportunity cost of other welfare-improving
programs. Alternatively, if the program is government guarantee, τ > 1 reflects the cost
of commitment, such as setting aside funds specifically for the program. Moreover, any
administrative cost incurred by providing subsidy or collecting tax can raise τ . Secondly,
if τ < 1, given negligible information frictions, the policy maker can easily restore the first
best and profit at the same time by offering t = s = c.8 The coordination problem then
becomes trivial. Therefore, for the rest of the paper, we assume τ ≥ 1.
Let C (θ, s, t; σ) denote the ex-post total cost of providing a subsidy-tax intervention program
(s, t) given the realized fundamental θ and the information friction σ. For full-participation
programs, i.e.,

s
t

≥ 1, all investors participate in the intervention program. The ex-post

8
To be precise, the policy maker should set t = s = c − ε with a very small ε to avoid over-investment
when θ < 0 and keep the left dominance region.

75

cost of implementation is

h
 ∗
i

 (τ s − t) 1 − F ξ (s,t)−θ ,
σ
C (θ, s, t; σ) =
i
h
 ∗

 τ s 1 − F ξ (s,t)−θ ,
σ

For partial-participation programs

c
b

≤

s
t

if θ ≥

c−s
b−t ,

if θ <

c−s
b−t .

(2.7)

< 1, only pivotal investors participate in the

intervention program. In this case,

h  ∗

 ∗
i

 (τ s − t) F η (s,t)−θ − F ξ (s,t)−θ , θ ≥
σ
σ
C (θ, s, t; σ) =
h  ∗

 ∗
i

η
(s,t)−θ
ξ
(s,t)−θ
 τs F
−F
,
θ<
σ
σ

If

s
t

c−s
b−t ,

(2.8)

c−s
b−t .

< bc , no agents will find it profitable to opt in to the intervention program, therefore

C (θ, s, t; σ) = 0.
Proposition 2.3 below compares the ex-post and ex-ante expected cost of partial-participation
programs and full-participation programs, which restore first best in the limit of vanishing
information frictions.
Proposition 2.3. With strictly costly subsidy τ > 1, when the information friction σ
goes to 0, there exists a continuum of full-participation programs (s, t) and a continuum of
partial-participation programs (s 0 , t 0 ) achieving the first-best outcome, where s = s 0 = c and
t ≤ c < t 0 ≤ b.
For any such (s, t) and (s 0 , t 0 ), given θ, the full-participation program (s, t) is ex-post more
costly than the partial-participation program (s 0 , t 0 ). Specifically,

lim C (θ, s, t; σ) = τ s − t > lim C (θ, s 0 , t 0 ; σ) = 0,

σ→0

σ→0

lim C (θ, s, t; σ) = τ s − t > lim C (θ, s 0 , t 0 ; σ) =

σ→0

σ→0

s0
0
t 0 (τ s

lim C (θ, s, t; σ) = lim C (θ, s 0 , t 0 ; σ) = 0,

σ→0

σ→0

− t 0 ),

if θ > 0;
if θ = 0;
if θ < 0.

Moreover, the full-participation program (s, t) is ex-ante strictly more costly than the partial76

participation program (s 0 , t 0 ). Specifically, lim Eθ C (θ, s, t; σ) > lim Eθ C (θ, s 0 , t 0 ; σ) = 0.
σ→0

σ→0

The proof is in the Appendices. When the information friction is small, although both
full-participation programs and partial-participation programs can effectively reduce coordination failures and restore the first-best outcome, the partial-participation programs are
ex-post weakly less costly than the full-participation programs in all states. Intuitively,
compared with full-participation programs, partial-participation programs have less participants since the optimistic investors are deterred from participating. This subsequently
reduces the cost of implementation. If the policy maker evaluates the ex-ante expected cost
of the programs, in the limit of negligible information frictions, the partial-participation
programs incur zero cost and strictly dominate the full-participation programs.
Now we extend the analysis to the case of non-negligible information frictions σ > 0. To
facilitate the comparison of the cost of different programs given the same fundamental θ∗ ,
we introduce an alternative parameterization of the intervention programs. Specifically, an
intervention program (s, t) can be equivalently parameterized by (θ∗ , λ) as follows,
c − θ∗ b
+ θ∗ λ,
1 − θ∗
c − θ∗ b
+ λ.
t=
1 − θ∗

s=

θ∗ =

c−s
b−t

is the target fundamental threshold, and λ =

t−s
1−θ∗

is proportional to the net tax

charged by the program when the project succeeds. λ can also be interpreted as the scale of
the program because given the same target θ∗ , both tax and subsidy are strictly increasing
in λ. Intuitively, when λ increases, the intervention program charges a higher net tax and
becomes less attractive. To achieve the same target, the government needs to increase the
direct subsidy s (and the tax t at the same time) to provide more downside protection to
∗

b
the investors. When λ ∈ [− c−θ
1−θ∗ , 0], the subsidy-to-tax ratio
b−c
full-participation program. When λ ∈ (0, 1−θ
∗ ),

c
b

<

s
t

s
t

≥ 1, and the program is a

< 1, and the program is a partial-

participation program. Note that to achieve the same target θ∗ , the partial-participation
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programs are larger in scale λ than the full-participation programs. The reason is that
partial-participation programs are less generous, i.e. have lower subsidy-to-tax ratio than
full-participation programs, the magnitude of partial-participation programs need to be
larger to provide more downside protection as compensation.
Suppose the policy maker is considering switching from a full-participation program (θ∗ , λ)
to a partial-participation program (θ∗ , λ0 ). The change in the expected cost of implementation comes from both the extensive and the intensive margin. On the extensive margin,
the most optimistic investors will no longer enter the program. Hence, this effect always
reduces the expected cost of intervention. However, on the intensive margin, the cost of
providing the program to an individual investor could increase or decrease. Formally, the
difference in unit cost is

0

0

ĉ(θ, s , t ) − ĉ(θ, s, t) =



 (τ θ∗ − 1)(λ0 − λ),

if θ ≥ θ∗ ,


 τ θ∗ (λ0 − λ),

if θ < θ∗ .

With vanishing information frictions, the effect on the intensive margin is negligible because
the mass of participants in partial-participation programs goes to zero except for the knifeedge case of θ = θ∗ . Therefore, switching to any partial-participation program will always
reduce the cost of implementation. This is no longer true with non-negligible information
frictions. In proposition 2.4, we provide two sufficient conditions such that switching to a
partial-participation program reduces the expected cost of implementation.
Proposition 2.4. For any σ > 0, if 1 ≤ τ < G (θ∗ , 1) or θ∗ (1 + σ) < 1, there exists
a partial-participation program (θ∗ , λ) which achieves θ∗ at lower expected cost than any
full-participation program targeting θ∗ , where G (α, β) is defined for any 0 ≤ α ≤ β ≤ 1 as
R F −1 (β)

G (α, β) =

F (x)dx

F −1 (α)
α(F −1 (β) −
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F −1 (α))

.

The proof involves technical details and is included in the Appendix. Here we provide
some intuitions. Since partial-participation programs provide more subsidy and charges
more tax to each participants, the effect on the intensive margin depends on the ratio of
expected mass of taxpayers to the expected mass of subsidy receivers. This ratio is equal
to G (θ∗ , 1) in a partial-participation program (θ∗ , λ) when λ approaches 0. If τ < G (θ∗ , 1),
the ratio is large enough such that the increase in expected tax revenue is greater than
the increase in expected subsidy provision. Hence, the effect on the intensive margin also
works in favor of the partial-participation programs, and switching to a partial-participation
program with small λ reduces the expected cost. Notice for any given θ∗ < 1, G (θ∗ , 1) > 1.
Therefore, the special case of τ = 1 always satisfies the first condition. The second condition
governs the relative importance of the two margins. If θ∗ and σ are jointly small, the
participation threshold η ∗ for partial-participation programs is also small, therefore the
mass of participants is significantly reduced. In particular, if the second condition holds,
the effect on the extensive margin dominates that on the intensive margin, making the
proposed partial-participation program less costly than any full-participation programs.
In summary, Proposition 2.4 gives three circumstances in which the most cost-efficient
subsidy-tax program is a partial-participation program: ambitious target (small θ∗ ), small
information frictions (small σ), or small cost of subsidy τ . Note that as a special case, if
the policy maker targets at the first-best θ∗ = 0, there always exists a partial-participation
program that dominates all full-participation programs.
We use a numerical example to demonstrates how switching to a partial-participation program from a full-participation program can reduce the expected cost of the intervention.
Suppose the prior on θ is uniformly distributed on [θ, θ̄] = [−0.2, 1.2]. The private noise
ε follows a uniform distribution over [− 12 , 12 ] and σ = 0.2. c and b are set to 1 and 1.25,
so the benchmark success threshold is

c
b

= 0.8. The policy maker has a cost parameter

τ = 1.05 and targets a success threshold θ∗ = 0.2. The least costly full-participation program to achieve the equilibrium threshold is s = t = 0.9375. The ex-post cost as a function
of the realized fundamental is represented by the solid blue line in Figure 9. The cost is
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Figure 9: Cost Functions
positive for all θ > θ∗ because all investing agents sign up for the program and there’s a
positive cost τ s − t of providing this program to each agent. When θ falls below θ∗ , the cost
surges because the investment projects fail and the policy maker can’t recover t. Now the
policy maker switches to a partial-participation program. There’s a continuum of partialparticipation programs that targets the same threshold θ∗ . We take (s 0 , t 0 ) = (0.97, 1.1)
for an example. The red dashed line in the top panel of Figure 9 represents the ex-post
cost function of program (s 0 , t 0 ). It has a similar shape as the cost function of the fullparticipation program. However, it converges to 0 when θ is large enough so that all agents
receive signals higher than η ∗ and no agents participate in the intervention program. The
difference between the two cost functions is plotted in the bottom panel. Compared to
the full-participation program, the partial-participation program incurs lower cost when
θ > θ∗ because of the higher tax charge and the lower participation rate. When θ < θ∗ ,
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since the partial-participation program provides higher subsidy, it incurs higher cost than
the full-participation program. On average, the partial-participation program incurs lower
expected cost.
2.3.2. Discussions
From previous analyses, we show that partial-participation intervention programs can improve the coordination results to the first-best outcome in the investment game, yet has
zero cost when the information friction vanishes. This result seems striking at first glance.
The most important reason why the partial-participation intervention program works effectively at a minimal cost is that it targets precisely the marginal agents who are on the
investment threshold and can be incentivized to invest relatively easily. These agents are
also the “pivotal” investors whose investment decisions are crucial in the determination of
the investment threshold. The figure below demonstrates how through higher-order beliefs,
our proposal effectively reduces coordination failure.
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Figure 10: Role of Higher-Order Beliefs

In each iteration, the lower axis denotes the signal received by an agent, and the upper axis
denotes the corresponding belief. Start from the cutoff strategy ξ0∗ , which is the original
cutoff without intervention. The partial intervention program incentivizes agents to lower
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the investment threshold to ξ1∗ . Since all agents understand that more agents are willing to
invest, given the same private signals, they all believe in a higher aggregate action l and a
higher probability of successful investment p(x; ξ1∗ ). Therefore, they are willing to lower their
investment threshold further to ξ2∗ . Similarly, with the additional mass of agents receiving
signals between ξ1∗ and ξ2∗ investing, all agents are more optimistic about the success of the
investment and therefore further lower their investment threshold to ξ3 . At the same time,
as the agents become more optimistic about their investments, the intervention program
becomes less attractive, which implies a decreasing sequence of participation thresholds ηn∗ .
With an infinite number of iterations, both the investment threshold and the participation
threshold are significantly lowered. As the information friction decreases, investors become
more certain about the coordination results, so the mass of “pivotal” investors shrinks to
zero. However, as long as there exist a few pivotal investors, the intervention program will
have a significant effect on the investment threshold due to higher-order beliefs.
Our partial-participation programs share similar spirit to the targeted intervention programs. Sakovics and Steiner (2012) analyze coordination games with heterogeneous agents
and argue that the optimal subsidy schedule is to target a certain type of agent. In section
5, we examine an extension with heterogeneous agents and show that there exist partialparticipation programs that incur zero cost to restore first-best outcome in the limit of
negligible information frictions. Similar to the main model, in equilibrium, only a small
mass of “pivotal” agents self-select to accept the policy maker’s offer. The only difference
is that different agent types have different thresholds, and the “pivotal” agents are the ones
receiving signals around their own thresholds. The result conveys one message contrasting
Sakovics and Steiner (2012) that policy makers should target interim rather than ex-ante
important types. Also, one common problem with targeted intervention programs is that
information acquisition to identify the targeted type(s) can be costly. The policy maker
needs to correctly identify each agent’s type to implement the targeted intervention programs. In contrast, our proposed intervention programs incentivize the “pivotal” agents to
self-reveal their types, therefore the implementation only requires information on the payoff
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structure of different types. As a result, our proposed program is superior to the targeted
intervention programs in terms of reducing the costs of collecting information.

2.4. Interventions in the Presence of Moral Hazard
In this section, we address the concern of moral hazard problem of government guarantees
and demonstrate our proposal’s robustness to moral hazard problems. For example, in the
context of self-fulfilling credit freeze (Bebchuk and Goldstein, 2011), banks may abstain from
lending in fear that the other banks will withdraw lending, which results in a coordination
failure of credit crunch. If the government provides guarantees on bank losses, the banks
may have the incentive to shirk in screening and monitoring the borrowers, since the losses
caused by shirking is guaranteed by the government. In order to do incorporate moral
hazard problems in the model, we modify the game into two stages. The first stage is the
same as the benchmark model with an intervention program, except that the payoffs are not
realized until the second stage. If the realized fundamental θ < 1 − l, we say the aggregate
state is Bad. In this case, the investment project fails and the game ends immediately. If the
realized fundamental θ ≥ 1 − l, we say the aggregate state is Good. In this case, the game
enters the second stage, in which investors make their effort choices. If an investor exerts
effort, the investor pays a cost of effort c e , and her project succeeds with probability 1.9 On
the other hand, if an investor shirks, her own project succeeds with probability 1 − γ. As
in the benchmark model, the project generates b in case of success and 0 in case of failure.
And for the participants in the intervention program, they are required to pay tax t if their
investments are successful. We make the following assumption on the parameters.
Assumption 2.1. The investment opportunity has the following properties,
a) shirking is inefficient, c e < γb;
9
The results hold as long as the success probability when exerting effort is between 1 − γ and 1, which
prevents the policy maker from inferring effort choice based on ex-post investment outcome. Otherwise, the
moral hazard problem can potentially be solved by imposing ex-post punishment when the policy maker
observes failed investment.
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b) the investment projects are ex-ante efficient, b > c + c e .
Given the assumptions above, the first-best scenario is that all agents invest and exert effort
if the fundamental θ ≥ 0, and all agents do not invest otherwise.
The equilibrium with moral hazard problem can be solved backward. In the second stage,
an investor would exert effort if and only if

b − t − c e ≥ (1 − γ)(b − t).

(2.9)

This condition can be interpreted as a constraint on the size of the tax t,

t ≤b−

ce
.
γ

(2.10)

When the tax is above the threshold, participating investors has too little “skin in the
game” to exert effort, resulting in inefficient outcomes. Intuitively, with a higher cost of
effort c e or lower losses caused by shirking γ, the incentive problem is more severe, imposing
a tighter constraint on the size of tax t.
Next, we will analyze the equilibrium under different programs and examine whether a fullparticipation program like government guarantee or a partial-participation program can
achieve first best when there is moral hazard problem in the private investment project. In
the context of our model, we interpret the government guarantee program as a subsidy-tax
program (s, t) with s = t, which is the full-participation programs with least cost. Since
participating in the government guarantee program weakly dominates investing alone, every
investor will take advantage of this program.
Government Guarantee. The moral hazard problem in the second stage imposes an
upper limit on the scale of the government guarantee program if the policy maker wants to
enforce effort.
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The expected payoff from investing with the government guarantee program is

E[π̃(θ, l)|xi ] =



 p̂i (b − t − c e ) − (c − s),

if t ≤ b −

ce
γ ,


 p̂i (1 − γ)(b − t) − (c − s),

if t > b −

ce
γ .

(2.11)

From the analysis of the benchmark model, we know that in the unique Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, the fundamental threshold above which the aggregate state is good is equal
to the belief of the marginal investor. Given a program with t ≤ b − c e /γ that prevents
shirking, the fundamental threshold in equilibrium is
θ∗ =

c −s
.
b − t − ce

(2.12)

Given a program with t > b − c e /γ that tolerates shirking, the fundamental threshold in
equilibrium is
θ∗ =

c −s
.
(1 − γ)(b − t)

(2.13)

In both cases, reducing the fundamental threshold to the first best θ∗ = 0 requires the
subsidy s to be as close to c as possible. However, by the nature of the intervention
program, this also requires the contingent tax t = s to be as close to c as possible. The
scale of the intervention program is constrained by the incentive constraint as shown in
(2.10), and whether the constraint is binding depends on the severity of the moral hazard
problem.
Assumption 2.2. The moral hazard problem is severe,

ce
γ

> b − c.

Given Assumption 2.2 above, the maximum program size t that prevents shirking in the
second period is strictly less than c, the cost of the investment project. Therefore, the
government guarantee program cannot achieve efficient fundamental threshold in the first
stage and prevent shirking in the second period at the same time. The result is summarized
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in Proposition 2.5 below. When Assumption 2.2 does not hold, the government guarantee
program with t = c achieves the first-best outcome.
Proposition 2.5. Given Assumption 2.1 and 2.2, no government guarantee program can
restore the first-best outcome when σ → 0.
Partial-participation Programs.
s
t

Now let us consider a subsidy-tax program with

∈ [ bc , 1). Given that the tax is higher than the subsidy, whether to participate in the

program depends on investors’ idiosyncratic beliefs of the probability that the aggregate
state is good. As in the benchmark model, the program is the most attractive to agents
with intermediate beliefs. What complicates the analyses is that agents will take into account their effort decisions in the second period when they compare the cost and benefit of
participating in the program. When the moral hazard problem in the second period is not
severe, i.e., Assumption 2.2 does not hold, the policy maker can choose s = c and t ∈ [c, b)
to implement the first-best outcome, which is the same as government guarantee programs.
In the following analyses, we focus on the case when the moral hazard problem is severe,
i.e., Assumption 2.2 holds, and full-participation government guarantee programs cannot
achieve the first best.
Given that Assumption 2.2 holds and t > c, the optimistic agents will reject the intervention
offer and exert effort, the agents with medium beliefs will accept the intervention offer and
shirk. Intuitively, the intervention offer reduces participant’s investment risk as well as
“skin in the game”. The most optimistic agents who strongly believe in the success of
investment do not want to share the profits with the policy maker. Therefore, they will
reject the offer and fully endogenize the payoff from investment which incentivizes them to
make the first-best effort choice. In contrast, the agents with medium beliefs are willing to
invest only if the policy maker bears part of the investment risk. However, the intervention
program also reduces their “skin in the game” because they need to share the investment
profits with the policy maker but bare the full cost of effort. As a result, these agents will
participate in the intervention program and shirk.
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Formally, given the optimal effort choices in the second stage, the expected payoffs from
{a = 1, Reject} and {a = 1, Accept} for an agent who receives signal xi and forms belief p̃i
are

E[π(θ, l)|xi ] = p̃i (b − c e ) − c,

(2.14)

E[π̃(θ, l)|xi ] = p̃i (1 − γ)(b − t) − (c − s).

(2.15)

The expected payoffs are linear and increasing in the belief p̃i , and the slopes are different.
The difference in the slopes of Eπ(θ, l) and Eπ̃(θ, l),
(b − c e ) − (1 − γ)(b − t) = γb + t(1 − γ) − c e > 0

(2.16)

is strictly positive given Assumption 2.1a. Investing alone is the optimal choice if and only
if the belief p̃i exceeds the critical participation belief
p2∗ (s, t) ≡

s
.
γb + t(1 − γ) − c e

(2.17)

Not investing is the optimal action choice if and only if the belief of the agent is worse than
the critical investment belief
p1∗ (s, t) ≡

c −s
.
(1 − γ)(b − t)

(2.18)

The optimal action choice if the belief of success probability is between p1∗ (s, t) and p2∗ (s, t)
is to invest and accept the offer.
Similar to those in the benchmark model, the critical beliefs determine the equilibrium
thresholds of investment and participation regarding the private signal x. Investment efficiency in the first stage requires the critical investment belief p1∗ (s, t) to be as close to 0 as
possible, which implies that the policy maker should choose subsidy s = c. On the other
hand, if t can be selected properly such that the critical participation belief p2∗ (s, t) < 1,
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the investors who are very optimistic about the aggregate state would choose to invest and
reject the offer. The exclusion of optimistic investors from the program improves efficiency
in the second stage game and reduces the policy maker’s cost from inefficient failures due
to shirking. As the information friction goes to zero, the mass of “pivotal” investors who
participate in the program goes to zero. The following proposition summarizes the result.
Proposition 2.6. Given Assumption 2.1 and 2.2, the equilibrium outcome given a subsidytax program (s, t) with s = c and

c+c e −γb
1−γ

< t < b converges to the first best when σ → 0.

The ex-ante cost of providing such program also converges to 0 when σ → 0.
The above proposition demonstrates the advantage of the partial-participation programs
compared with full-participation programs like government guarantee when the moral hazard problem is relatively severe. In the benchmark model, both types of programs can
achieve the first-best outcome at zero cost with diminishing information friction if τ = 1.
They are different in terms of the program size: full-participation programs invite all investors, while partial-participation programs only target the “pivotal” investors. Absent
other frictions, the size of a program does not alter the efficiency or the cost of implementing the program. However, the moral hazard problem causes welfare losses in proportion
to the size of a program. When using a government guarantee program, the policy maker
faces a trade-off between the first-stage investment efficiency and the second-stage effort
efficiency. A program with high subsidy over tax ratio ( st ) encourages investment in the
first stage but deters effort input in the second stage. This trade-off limits the role of the
government guarantee program in improving social efficiency. On the contrary, despite the
moral hazard problem, a partial-participation program still achieves the first-best outcome
at zero cost. The advantage of partial-participation programs in dealing with moral hazard
is that they only involve a small mass of investors. Although these participating investors
shirk in the second stage, it will have a limited impact on the social welfare since the mass
of these participating investors goes to zero as the information friction vanishes. In general,
the partial-participation program proposed in this paper is superior to the full-participation
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programs such as government guarantee in the presence of any size-related inefficiency.

2.5. Extensions
2.5.1. Unobservable Ex-ante Heterogeneity
In this part, we study whether the existence of ex-ante heterogeneity in agents’ payoff structure and information structure changes our results. The assumptions on the heterogeneity
resemble those in Sakovics and Steiner (2012). Our analyses differ from their paper in two
dimensions. First, they studied the optimal intervention when the policy maker can only
provide a lump-sum subsidy, while we consider subsidy-tax programs. Second, they assume
the types of agents are observable, while we allow for hidden types.
There are N groups of infinitesimal agents indexed by g , each group with mass mg . There
are three folds of heterogeneity. First, the agents differ in their profitability. They pay the
same investment cost c yet earn different revenue b g from successful investment. Assume
there is no inefficient project, so b g > c for all g . Second, the agents impose different
levels of externalities for the coordination results. Specifically, the aggregate action l =
PN R mg g g
g =1 0 w ai di. Same as in the benchmark model, the condition that investment is
P
g g
successful is l ≥ 1 − θ. The weights are normalized such that N
g =1 w m = 1. Lastly, each
agent receives a private signal xig = θ + σεgi , where εgi is independent across agents and


follows a group-specific distribution with c.d.f. F g (ε), the support of which is − 21 , 12 . We
assume an agent’s group is not observable to the policy maker. However, the policy maker
knows the composition of agents.
The equilibrium without intervention is summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 2.7. Without intervention, there is a unique equilibrium in which an agent in
group g invests if and only if her private signal is greater or equal to ξ0g , which is given by
ξ0g

=

N
X
g =1

mg w g

c 
c
−1
+
σF
.
g
bg
bg
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(2.19)

From the above proposition, we can calculate the fundamental threshold θ∗ above which
the investments are successful. The expression for the fundamental threshold is given by

θ∗ =

N
X

mg w g

g =1

c
,
bg

(2.20)

which is a weighted average of the cost-benefit ratio of different types of agents. Let bmin =
min {b g }N
g =1 . The following proposition shows our previous results still hold when there is
unobservable heterogeneity among agents.
Proposition 2.8. Given a subsidy-tax program with s < c and s < t < bmin , there exists a
unique equilibrium in which a type j agent follows the strategy below,
a = 1, Reject, if x ≥ ηg∗ (s, t),
a = 1, Accept, if ξg∗ (s, t) ≤ x < ηg∗ (s, t),
a = 0, if x < ξg∗ (s, t),

where
ξg∗ (s, t)

=

N
X
g =1

ηg∗ (s, t) =

c −s
m w g
+ σFg−1
b −t
g

N
X
g =1

g

mg w g



c −s
bg − t


,

 
c −s
−1 s
+
σF
.
g
bg − t
t

When s = c and c < t < bmin , the equilibrium outcome converges to the first-best outcome
and the expected cost of the program converges to 0 when σ → 0.
If agents also differ in the cost of investment, i.e., c g can be different across groups, we need
to relax the assumption that type are unobservable to the government. Instead, we assume
the government can observe ci for each individual agent. If ci = c g 1 = c g 2 , the government
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does not need to know whether agent i is from g 1 or g 2. Under this setup, it is equivalent
to solve the problem with c˜g = 1 and b˜g =

bg
cg ,

then scale up agent i’s offer by cig .

The intuition for how our proposed intervention program works in the case with ex-ante
heterogeneous agents is essentially the same as in the benchmark model. The intervention
program incentivizes “pivotal” agents who originally choose not to invest to change their
decisions. All agents knowing that there is an increase in the aggregate action l all believe in
a higher probability of success. Amplified by higher-order beliefs, the intervention program
can efficiently restore the first-best coordination results. Note that the notion of “pivotal”
agents refers to the interim type of agents. Since different groups earn different profitabilities
from successful investments, they require a different success probability to agree to invest.
Our intervention program identifies and targets agents with beliefs right below the cutoffs of
their own group. In Sakovics and Steiner (2012), they only look at direct subsidy programs
and argue that an efficient program should target the ex-ante “pivotal” group, the group
with low b g and high w g in our setup. Our results above demonstrate that by allowing
an additional intervention tool, the contingent tax t, we are able to reduce coordination
failure at a much lower cost. Moreover, the implementation of our proposed program does
not require information on an agent’s group, therefore our proposed program could save the
potential cost of information acquisition.
2.5.2. General Payoff Structure
In this section, we follow the setups of the symmetric binary-action global games in Morris
and Shin (2003) and allow for general monotonic payoff functions.
As in the benchmark model in section 2, an agent’s payoff from not investing (ai = 0) is
normalized to zero. An agent’s payoff from investing (ai = 1) is modified to be a continuous
function π(x, l), which weakly increases in both the private signal x and the aggregate action
R1
l = 0 ai di.10 The fundamental θ follows a uniform distribution on [θ, θ̄]. The private signal
10

We assume the payoff is a function of the private signal instead of the fundamental for simplicity of
demonstration. Our results still hold under the alternative setup. See Morris and Shin (2003) for the
discussion of the two setups.
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received by agent i is xi = θ + σεi , where εi are i.i.d. and has a density function f (ε) and a
distribution function F (ε) with support [− 21 , 12 ].
For simplicity, we only consider the family of linear intervention programs. In general, we
could allow transfer as a non-linear function of the agents’ payoff. The intervention program
(s, t) consists of two parts, a direct subsidy s ≥ 0 and a proportional tax t ∈ [0, 1]. If an
agent accepts the offer, she receives the direct upfront subsidy s and pays the proportional
tax after the realization of the investment outcome. Her payoff from accepting the offer is11

π̃(x, l) = (1 − t)π(x, l) + s.

(2.21)

Agents who receive low private signals believe in low realization of the fundamental θ and low
aggregate action l, so they are pessimistic about their payoffs from investments. Therefore,
they expect to pay low tax and are more willing to accept the offer than optimistic agents.
Recall the partial-participation programs in the benchmark model. These programs do not
appeal to the optimistic agents who do not need extra incentive to invest, which efficiently
saves resources and reduces the cost of the program. The proportional tax t captures this
feature and helps to target agents receiving medium signals.
We adopt the standard assumptions on the payoff function in the literature.
Assumption 2.3. The payoff function π(x, l) satisfy the following properties:
1. (Monotonicity) The payoff function π(x, l) is weakly increasing in both arguments.
2. (Strict Laplacian State Monotonicity)

R1
0

π(x, l)dl is strictly increasing in x.

11
One might notice that when π(x, l) < 0, investors end up paying a negative “tax”. In fact, let π =
π(θ − 12 σ, 0) be the lower bound of the payoff. The intervention program can be implemented by providing
a positive subsidy s − tπ and imposing a proportional tax t on the positive tax base π(x, l) − π.
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3. (Limit Dominance) There exists θ0 , θ1 ∈ (θ + 21 σ, θ̄ − 12 σ) such that

4. (Continuity)

R1
0

π(x, 1) < 0, for all x < θ0 ,

(2.22)

π(x, 0) > 0, for all x > θ1 ,

(2.23)

g (l)π(x, l)dl is continuous in x for any density function g .

The first assumption states the strategic complementarities among the investment choices
of different agents. The individual payoff of investing increases when more agents invest.
Also, a higher fundamental increases everyone’s incentive to invest, given the same aggregate
investment. Note that the payoff function need not be strictly increasing or continuous. For
example, the payoff function in our benchmark model in Section 2 is a step function. The
role of the second assumption is to make sure the equilibrium is unique when it exists,
with or without the intervention program. The third assumption ensures the existence of
two dominance regions so that we can adopt the iterated deletion of dominated strategies
from both sides. The last assumption regulates integration of the payoff function so the
equilibrium always exists.
The equilibrium without intervention is characterized in the proposition below. The “natural outcome” serves as a benchmark to analyze the effect of intervention programs.
Proposition 2.9. Without intervention (s = t = 0), when the information friction σ is
small enough, there is a unique equilibrium in which each agent invests if and only if her
private signal x ≥ ξ0∗ given by
Z

1

π(ξ0∗ , l)dl = 0.

0

Compare the coordination results characterized in the above proposition with the first-best
outcome. In the first-best scenario, if all agents investing can generate positive surplus, the
social optimal outcome is for all agents to invest. In other words, the first-best scenario is
that all agents follow the same cutoff strategy θ0 , the upper bound for the left dominance
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region. By Assumption 2.3, unless π(θ0 , l) = 0 for any l ∈ [0, 1], the natural coordination
outcome ξ ∗ > θ0 . Therefore if the realized fundamental θ ∈ (ξ ∗ , θ0 ), there would be a
coordination failure. And the goal of intervention is to reduce the coordination threshold
from ξ ∗ to as close to θ0 as possible.
Next we analyze the equilibrium with an intervention program (s, t). We focus on the
partial-participation programs and demonstrate its zero cost of implementation in the limiting case. Proposition 2.10 summarizes the conditions for such partial-participation programs.
Definition 2.1. A intervention program (s, t) is a partial-participation program with target
ξ ∗ if and only if it satisfy the following three conditions,
1. (Intervention Target)

R1
0

s
.
π(ξ ∗ , l)dl = − 1−t

2. (Optimism Exclusion) π(ξ ∗ , 1) > st ,
s
,
3. (Left Dominance Region) π(θ, 1) < − 1−t

Denote a coordination game with information friction σ and intervention program (s, t) by
G (σ; s, t), we can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 2.10. Given a partial-participation program (s, t) with target ξ ∗ , the following
two properties must be satisfied in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the coordination game
G (σ; s, t),
1. Agents invests if and only if their private signal x > ξ ∗ ;
2. There exists a threshold η ∗ (σ) such that investing agents strictly prefer not to participate in the intervention program if and only if their private signal x > η ∗ (σ).
When σ → 0, η ∗ (σ) converge to ξ ∗ .
The above proposition provides conditions under which there exist partial-participation
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programs to reduce the investment threshold to ξ ∗ . Same as in the benchmark regimechange model, in the limit, ex ante expected mass of participants goes to zero, which
implies zero cost of implementation. The question remaining is whether there exist such
programs to costlessly restore the first-best scenario, i.e. ξ ∗ = θ0 . The proposition below
answers this question.
Proposition 2.11. If

R1
0

π(θ0 , l)dl ≥ π(θ, 1), for any ξ ∗ ∈ (θ0 , ξ0∗ ), there exists a partial-

participation program with target ξ ∗ .
With the intervention program, all agents become more optimistic about their investment
payoff. Therefore, the left dominance region, where agents prefer not to invest even if l = 1,
shrinks. The condition specified in Proposition 2.11 guarantees that the left dominance
region still exists with the intervention program. If the condition is violated, there might
be multiple equilibria when targeting ξ ∗ close to θ0 . However, if we follow the equilibrium
refinements proposed in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), we can select the equilibrium described in Proposition 2.10 even without the left dominance region. Therefore, following the
refinements, there always exists a partial-participation program that restores the first-best
scenario. Moreover, the left dominance region may disappear because we limit our attention
to programs with linear transfers. Linear transfer schedules generally gives a lot of subsidies in case of low fundamental. If the policy maker lowers subsidies in the case of very low
fundamental realizations (when θ < θ0 ) or adds convexity to the tax schedule properly, the
left dominance region as well as the uniqueness of the equilibrium can be recovered. Either
way, there always exists an intervention program that can restore the first-best scenario.

2.6. Selected Applications
The partial-participation programs can be applied to various contexts with coordination
problems. In this section, we discuss three representative applications.

95

2.6.1. Debt Rollover
It has been widely recognized in the literature that panic-based debt run can leads to
inefficient firm default. Specifically, consider a firm with many small debt-holders. The
firm is more likely to survive if more debt-holders roll over their debts. Therefore, debtholders’ rollover decisions features strategic complementarities. When the fundamental of
the firm is weak, debt-holders might stop rolling over their debts because they worry the
others would also stop, which can leads to self-fulfilling debt run. Our analyses suggest
tranching can be a cost-efficient way to reduce such coordination failure. Instead of one
standard debt contract, the firm can issue two types of debts with different seniorities.
The senior debt promises lower return yet provides higher payment than the junior debt
when the firm defaults. Without tranching, debt-holders who have medium beliefs and
coordination concerns would not roll over their standard debts. With the safer option of
senior debt, they are willing to lend to the firm which eases the liquidity concern of the firm
and boosts all debt-holders’ beliefs in the firm’s survival. This effect can be amplified by
higher order beliefs. In equilibrium, only the pivotal debt-holders choose the senior option.
However, the availability of the safer senior debt improves all debt-holders’ belief in that
the firm can raise enough funds to survive.
Bank run is another similar application. To implement the partial-participation programs,
the government can offer optional but costly deposit insurance. In fact, Alipay, the largest
online payment platform in China, offers all users an option to purchase insurance against
losses on their associated financial accounts. The insurance is costly if their accounts are
safe yet provides protection when the platform fails. Therefore, it would work in a similar
way as the senior debt option to reduce coordination failure. It is less costly than the
mandatory deposit insurance because it screens for the “pivotal depositors” and leaves out
the optimistic depositors who would not run even without insurance protection.

96

2.6.2. Market Freeze
During the 2008 financial crisis, many financial institutions and investors significantly reduced their leverage. This process pushed down the market prices of Commercial MortgageBacked Securities (CMBS) and Residual Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS). The markets
for RMBS and CMBS froze, and prices were well below their fundamentals. Among others,
coordination failure can prevent the market from thawing. If only a few investors participate in the market for Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS), the liquidity in the market is not
enough to drive the prices back to the fundamental and the participating investors suffer
losses on their investments. However, if a significant amount of liquidity is injected in the
market, the prices are more likely to be driven back to reflect the fundamental and investors
who bought at a discount can profit from the investment.
In March of 2009, the US Treasury announced the Legacy Securities Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP). Under the program, private equity was matched by government
equity and debt to form Public-Private Investment Funds (PPIFs) and purchase highly
rated legacy MBS from financial institutions. Private investors in the PPIFs effectively
receive investment subsidies from the government and are levered up for their investment.
They earn higher investment return in good times and are protected by limited liabilities
in bad times. Hence, PPIP is uniformly beneficial to all qualifying private investors and
can be interpreted as full-participation programs in our model. PPIP is not efficient in
resource allocation in the sense that part of the government funding is provided to the
optimistic investors who would have invested in MBS market without PPIP. According to
our analyses, the government can reduce the cost of rejuvenating the market by offering a
partial-participation program instead. Mapping into the context of PPIP, the government
could offer to inject equity into PPIFs in proportion to debt holdings by private investors.
This option of debt investment reduces the losses from freezing the MBS market. As a
return, the government shares the profit of investment if the market for MBS is successfully
rejuvenated. This offer incentivizes the pivotal investors to invest in the MBS market. Since
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all investors are aware of the offer, they know that the aggregate investment will increase
and hence also have more incentive to invest.
2.6.3. Shopping Mall Investment
We analyze a real investment problem in this section. Pashigian and Gould (1998) documents the strategic complementarities among department stores in the same shopping mall.
Specifically, department stores with reputations can bring in mall traffic and increase the
sales of less-known stores. As discussed in Sakovics and Steiner (2012), the difference in
reputation maps into wg , the importance in coordination outcome of different groups in
section 5.1.
Consider a newly opened shopping mall inviting different brands to open new stores. Since
all stores benefit from customers’ visit to the shopping mall, all stores’ investment return
increases in the occupancy ratio of the shopping mall. Therefore, coordination failure
could lead to low occupancy ratio and failure of the shopping mall. In order to boost
investment, according to our analyses, the shopping mall manager could offer an equity
injection option. Specifically, if a brand accepts the equity injection offer and opens a new
store in the shopping mall, the shopping mall manager pays part of the investment cost
and receives proportional profit made by the store as a return. This offer is not appealing
to the optimistic brands because they do not want to share the profits with the shopping
mall. For brands that are around investment threshold, the equity injection offer reduces
their investment risk and increases their expected payoff from the investment. Amplified by
higher-order beliefs, all brands significantly lower their investment threshold. Moreover, in
equilibrium, only the “pivotal” brands accept the offer. Therefore the resources to finance
the intervention program are efficiently allocated.
It is reasonable to assume different brands have different profit functions. We have shown in
section 5.2 that the interim critical agents who are around their own investment thresholds
self-select to accept our offer. The result that the equity injection offer effectively reduces
coordination failure and incurs low financing cost for the shopping mall owner still holds.
98

2.7. Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze a canonical coordination game under global games framework and
propose a novel intervention program for a policy maker to reduce coordination failures.
The intervention program screens for the marginal agents who receive medium signals,
which reduces the cost of implementation for the program. At the same time, correctly
incentivizing the marginal agents have a significant impact on all agents due to strategic
complementarities and the amplification through higher order beliefs. In the limit of zero
noise in agents’ private signals, our proposed program eliminates all coordination failures
at zero cost since the expected mass of marginal investors goes to zero. Compared with
conventional government guarantee type of programs, our proposed program not only incurs
lower cost of implementation but also is shown to be more robust to moral hazard problems.
We demonstrate with three examples that our proposed program has a wide range of applications in improving coordination failures. As a concluding remark, we would like to
point out some limitations of the proposed program. First, the program requires the policy
maker to observe and condition the provision of the program on agents’ action choices,
which might not be feasible. For example, in the context of panic-based currency attack,
it is hard to trace the identities of the currency holders and give them an optional offer.
Second, the effectiveness of the proposed program relies on agents’ rationality. If agents
possess bounded rationality, the amplification effect through higher order beliefs will be
limited.
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2.8. Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1. It can be proved by iterated deletion of dominated strategies. Let
p(x; k) denote the interim belief of success when an agent receives private signal x and all
other agents follow a cutoff investment strategy k as defined in (2.4). First, we want to
show that strategies survive n rounds of iterated deletion of dominated strategies if and
only if

where

a(x) = 0, if x < ξ n ,

(2.24)

and a(x) = 1, if x ≥ ξ¯n .

(2.25)

−∞ = ξ 0 < ξ 1 ≤ · · · ≤ ξ n ≤ · · · ≤ ξ¯n ≤ · · · ≤ ξ¯1 < ξ¯0 = +∞.

(2.26)

n
o∞
(ξ n , ξ¯n )

n=0

satisfies

This result can be proved by induction. Let ξ 0 = −∞ and ξ¯0 = +∞, so the first round
of deletion starts with the full set of strategies. Suppose round n ∈ N of deletion has been
completed. In round n + 1, the best scenario for an agent to invest is that all other agents
follow a cutoff strategy with threshold ξ n . Therefore, for any x such that p(x; ξ n ) <

c
b,

a(x) = 1 is strictly worse than a(x) = 0. Similarly, the best scenario for an agent to choose
ai = 1 is that all other agents follow a cutoff strategy with threshold ξ n . As a result, for x
such that p(x; ξ¯n ) > bc , any strategy profile with a(x) = 1 is strictly better than a(x) = 0.
Given p(x; k) is non-decreasing in x, the strategy profiles that survives deletion of dominated strategies can be summarized in the form of (2.24)(2.25), with (ξ n+1 , ξ¯n+1 ) defined
inductively as
n
co
ξ n+1 = inf x : p(x; ξ n ) ≥
b
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(2.27)

and
n
co
ξ¯n+1 = sup x : p(x; ξ¯n ) ≤
b

(2.28)

The monotonicity of p(x; k) guarantees that ξ n+1 ≤ ξ¯n+1 given ξ n ≤ ξ¯n . Note the dominance
region assumption implies that ξ 1 > −∞ and ξ¯1 < +∞ when σ is small enough. Therefore,
n
o∞
is a well-defined sequence of real couple which satisfies (2.26).
(ξ n , ξ¯n )
n=0

¯ ∞
Now we’ve proved that {ξ n }∞
n=1 and {ξn }n=1 are both monotonic and bounded sequences.
Thus, they converges to two finite numbers ξ and ξ¯ respectively when n → ∞. And the two
limits satisfy
¯
ξ ≤ ξ.

The definition (2.27)(2.28) implies that p(ξ; ξ) ≥

p(ξ; ξ) = F

(2.29)

c
b

ξ − θ∗ (ξ)
σ

¯ ξ)
¯ ≤ c . Note that
and p(ξ;
b


= θ∗ (ξ),

(2.30)

is strictly increasing in ξ. Therefore ξ = ξ¯ must be the unique solution to θ∗ (ξ) = bc , which
is
ξ0∗ =

c 
c
.
+ σF −1
b
b

(2.31)

Since there’s only one strategy that survives the iterated deletion of dominated strategies,
the equilibrium of the game is unique and the associated equilibrium strategy is the cutoff
investment strategy with threshold ξ0∗ .
Lemma 2.1. Suppose the optimal strategy of an agent as a function of her interim belief
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of success p̂i can be characterized as
ai = 1, Reject, if p̂i > p2∗ ,
ai = 1, Accept, if p1∗ < p̂i ≤ p2∗ ,
ai = 0, if p̂i ≤ p1∗ ,
where p1∗ and p2∗ are two threshold beliefs that satisfy 0 ≤ p1∗ < p2∗ ≤ 1. There is a unique
Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the equilibrium strategy of any agent is
ai = 1, Reject, if xi ≥ η ∗ ,
ai = 1, Accept, if ξ ∗ ≤ xi < η ∗ ,
ai = 0, if xi < ξ ∗ ,
where ξ ∗ = p1∗ + σF −1 (p1∗ ) and η ∗ = p1∗ + σF −1 (p2∗ )
o∞
n
such that strategies survives
Proof of Lemma 2.1. We want to find a sequence (ξ n , ξ¯n )
n=0

n rounds of iterated deletion of dominated strategies only if

a(x) = 0, if x < ξ n ,

(2.32)

and a(x) = 1, if x ≥ ξ¯n .

(2.33)

The reason that we can only iterate on the investment cutoff without keeping track of the
participation decisions is that an agent’s investment decision is independent of other agents’
n
o∞
participation decisions. The recursive expression for (ξ n , ξ¯n )
is
n=0

ξ n+1 = inf{x : p(x; ξ n ) ≥ p1∗ },

(2.34)

ξ¯n+1 = sup{x : p(x; ξ¯n ) ≤ p1∗ }.

(2.35)

Applying the same techniques in the proof of Proposition 2.1, it becomes clear that the
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limit of the two cutoff sequences converges to
ξ ∗ (s, t) = p1∗ + σF −1 (p1∗ ) ,

(2.36)

which is the investment cutoff in the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the global game.
The associated participation cutoff η is the solution to
p(η; ξ ∗ (s, t)) = p2∗ .

(2.37)

η ∗ (s, t) = p1∗ + σF −1 (p2∗ ) .

(2.38)

Solving the above equation yields

Proof of Proposition 2.2. In case 1, invest-and-reject is dominated by invest-and-accept.
Therefore, we can rewrite the investment payoff by letting b 0 = b − t and c 0 = c − s and
directly apply Proposition 2.1. Similarly, invest-and-accept is jointly dominated by investand-accept and not-invest in case 3. Since the intervention program is never going to be
accepted, the equilibrium is the same as that described in Proposition 2.1. Case 2 is a direct
implication of Lemma 2.1.

Proof of Proposition 2.3. As specified in equation 5, with program (s, t), the fundamental
cutoff is

c−s
b−t .

Therefore, the programs targeting at the first-best fundamental cutoff 0

should satisfy s = c. Hence, the subsidy to tax ratio of a program targeting at the first
best is

s
t

= ct . If the ratio is greater than 1, the program is a full-participation program.

Otherwise, it is a partial-participation program.
As a result, if (s, t) satisfies the following two conditions, it is a full-participation program
targeting the first best.
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1. 0 ≤ t ≤ c,
2. s = c.
If (s 0 , t 0 ) satisfies the following two conditions, it is a partial-participation program targeting
the first best.
1. c < t 0 ≤ b,
2. s 0 = c.
Lastly, we calculate the limit of the cost functions as specified in equation 7 and 8. For any
θ > 0,



0−θ
−1
lim C (θ, s, t) = lim (τ s − t) 1 − F
+ F (0)
= (τ s − t) [1 − F (−∞)] = τ s − t
σ→0
σ→0
σ

 
 0 


0−θ
0−θ
−1 s
−1
lim C (θ, s , t ) = lim (τ s − t ) F
+F
−F
+ F (0)
σ→0
σ→0
σ
t0
σ
0

0

0

0

= (τ s 0 − t 0 ) [F (−∞) − F (−∞)] = 0

If θ = 0,


lim C (θ, s, t) = lim (τ s − t) 1 − F F −1 (0) = τ s − t

σ→0

σ→0

 
 0 


s0
−1
−1 s
−
F
F
(0)
=
(τ s 0 − t 0 )
lim C (θ, s , t ) = lim (τ s − t ) F F
σ→0
σ→0
t0
t0
0

0

0

0

The cost of a partial-participation program is strictly less than that of a full-participation
program.
s0
c
(τ s 0 − t 0 ) = τ c 0 − c < τ c − c ≤ τ s − t
t0
t
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For any θ < 0,



0−θ
−1
lim C (θ, s, t) = lim τ s 1 − F
+ F (0)
= τ s [1 − F (∞)] = 0
σ→0
σ→0
σ

 
 0 


0−θ
0−θ
−1 s
−1
−F
lim C (θ, s , t ) = lim τ s F
+F
+ F (0)
σ→0
σ→0
σ
t0
σ
0

0

0

= τ s 0 [F (∞) − F (∞)] = 0

Proof of Proposition 2.4. We compare the expected cost of a full-participation program
with (s, t) a partial-participation program (s 0 , t 0 ) with small enough λ > 0.
The expected cost of the full-participation program is
τs
Eθ [C (θ, s, t)] =
θ̄ − θ

Z

θ̄




1−F

θ

ξ∗ − θ
σ



t
dθ −
θ̄ − θ

Z

θ̄




1−F

θ∗

ξ∗ − θ
σ


dθ,

and that of the partial-participation program (s 0 , t 0 ),
τ s0
Eθ [C (θ, s , t )] =
θ̄ − θ
0

0

Z
θ

θ̄

  ∗

 ∗


 ∗

Z θ̄   ∗
η −θ
ξ −θ
t0
η −θ
ξ −θ
F
−F
dθ −
F
−F
dθ,
σ
σ
σ
σ
θ̄ − θ θ∗

where ξ ∗ and η ∗ are the investment threshold and participation threshold defined as in
 0
Proposition 2.2, ξ ∗ = θ∗ + σF −1 (θ∗ ), η ∗ (s 0 , t 0 ) = θ∗ + σF −1 st 0 . To suppress notations, we
omit the dependence of η ∗ on (s 0 , t 0 ). The difference between the cost of full-participation
program (s, t) and that of partial-participation program (s 0 , t 0 ) can be decomposed into two
parts, Eθ [C (θ, s, t)] − Eθ [C (θ, s 0 , t 0 )] = ∆1 + ∆2 , where
 ∗

 ∗

Z 
Z θ∗ 
τ s − t θ̄
η −θ
τs
η −θ
dθ +
dθ,
∆1 =
1−F
1−F
σ
σ
θ̄ − θ θ∗
θ̄ − θ θ

 ∗


 ∗

Z   ∗
Z   ∗
τ θ∗ (t 0 − t) θ̄
η −θ
ξ −θ
t 0 − t θ̄
η −θ
ξ −θ
∆2 = −
F
−F
dθ +
F
−F
dθ.
σ
σ
σ
σ
θ̄ − θ
θ̄ − θ θ∗
θ
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∆1 and ∆2 are the cost difference on the extensive margin and intensive margin respectively.
Notice E[C (θ, s, t)] is linear in s and t. Therefore, the expected cost of any full-participation
∗

∗

b c−θ b
program lies between the cost of the guarantee program λ1 = 0 with (s, t) = ( c−θ
1−θ∗ , 1−θ∗ ),
∗

b
∗
and the pure subsidy program λ2 = − c−θ
1−θ∗ , with (s, t) = (c − θ b, 0). In the remaining

part of the proof, we show that if either of the two conditions is satisfied, the proposed
∗

∗

c−θ b
b
∗
partial-participation program (s 0 , t 0 ) = ( c−θ
1−θ∗ + θ λ, 1−θ∗ + λ) with small positive λ has

lower cost than both the guarantee program and the pure subsidy program.
Consider the pure subsidy program (s, t) = (c − θ∗ b, 0). Plugging (s, t) into the expression
of ∆1 , we have
τ (c − θ∗ b)
∆1 =
θ̄ − θ


 ∗

η −θ
1−F
dθ,
σ
θ


1
Z Z
τ (c − θ∗ b) θ̄ θ̄+ 2 σ 1
x −θ
=
f
dxdθ,
σ
σ
θ̄ − θ
η∗
θ


1 Z
Z
τ (c − θ∗ b) θ̄+ 2 σ θ̄ 1
x −θ
=
f
dθdx,
σ
θ̄ − θ
η∗
θ σ


1 
Z
τ (c − θ∗ b) θ̄+ 2 σ
x − θ̄
=
dx,
1−F
σ
θ̄ − θ
η∗
"
#
Z 1
2
τ (c − θ∗ b)
1
τ (c − θ∗ b)
∗
=
θ̄ + σ − η − σ
F (y )dy >
(1 − θ∗ ),
1
2
θ̄ − θ
θ̄ − θ
−2
Z

θ̄

which is strictly positive.
For ∆2 , notice
Z

β

α

  ∗

 ∗



Z β Z η∗
ξ −θ
1
x −θ
η −θ
−F
dθ =
f
dxdθ,
F
σ
σ
σ
α
ξ∗ σ


Z η∗ Z β
1
x −θ
=
f
dθdx,
σ
ξ∗
α σ



Z η∗  
x −α
x −β
−F
dx,
=
F
σ
σ
ξ∗
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therefore
c − θ∗ b
+ε
1 − θ∗





c − θ∗ b
+ε
1 − θ∗





c − θ∗ b
+ε
1 − θ∗




∆2 =

=
=

1
θ̄ − θ

"Z

η∗

F

x − θ∗
σ

"Z

F −1



ξ∗

θ∗ (η ∗ − ξ ∗ )
θ̄ − θ



#
dx − τ θ∗ (η ∗ − ξ ∗ ) ,

 0
s
t0

∗
−1
F −1 (θ∗ ) θ (F




0
θ∗ (η ∗ − ξ ∗ )
∗ s
G θ , 0 −τ .
t
θ̄ − θ

#
F (y )

dy − τ ,
s0
−1 (θ ∗ ))
t0 − F

Taking λ to 0, we have

lim+ ∆2 =

λ→0

c − θ∗ b
1 − θ∗



θ∗ σ( 21 − F −1 (θ∗ ))
c − θ∗ b ∗
[G (θ∗ , 1) − τ ] =
θ σ[G (θ∗ , 1) − τ ].
θ̄ − θ
θ̄ − θ

If the first condition holds, τ < G (θ∗ , 1), limε→0+ ∆2 > 0, ∆1 + ∆2 is strictly positive for
small enough λ. Also, if the second condition holds, θ∗ + σ < 1,

lim+ ∆1 + ∆2 >

λ→0

τ (c − θ∗ b)
(1 − θ∗ − θ∗ σ) > 0.
θ̄ − θ

Now let’s turn to the guarantee program with s = t =

c−θ∗ b
1−θ∗ .

For ∆1 , since η ∗ = θ∗ +

0

σF −1 ( st 0 ) < θ∗ + 12 σ, we have
(τ − 1)s
∆1 >
θ̄ − θ

Z

θ̄

"
1−F

θ∗

θ∗ + 12 σ − θ
σ

!#

τs
dθ +
θ̄ − θ

Z

θ∗

"
1−F

θ

θ∗ + 12 σ − θ
σ

!#
dθ ≥ 0.

The last inequality is strict when τ > 1. For ∆2 , we have
σθ∗ (F −1
∆2 = λ

 0


− F −1 (θ∗ ))   s 0 
∗
G θ , 0 −τ .
t
θ̄ − θ
s
t0

If τ > 1, limλ→0+ ∆1 > 0, limλ→0+ ∆2 = 0. Thus, Eθ [C (θ, s, t)]−Eθ [C (θ, s 0 , t 0 )] = ∆1 +∆2 >
0 for small enough λ.
If τ = 1, since

s0
t0

>

c
b



0
> θ∗ , G θ∗ , st 0 > 1 = τ , ∆2 > 0 for any positive λ. Combining with
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∆1 ≥ 0, we have Eθ [C (θ, s, t)] − Eθ [C (θ, s 0 , t 0 )] = ∆1 + ∆2 > 0 for any positve λ.
To sum up, in either case, when λ being positve and small enough, the partial particiaption
∗

∗

b
c−θ b
∗
program (s 0 , t 0 ) = ( c−θ
1−θ∗ +θ λ, 1−θ∗ +λ) has lower expected cost than any full-participation

program targeting θ∗ .
Proof of Proposition 2.6. If we can choose (s, t) properly such that 0 < p1∗ (s, t) <
p2∗ (s, t) < 1, Lemma 2.1 implies in the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium, agents follow a
threshold strategy
ai = 1, Reject, if xi ≥ η ∗ (s, t),
ai = 1, Accept, if ξ ∗ (s, t) ≤ xi < η ∗ (s, t),
ai = 0, if xi < ξ ∗ (s, t),

where
ξ ∗ (s, t) = p1∗ (s, t) + σF −1 (p1∗ (s, t)),
η ∗ (s, t) = p1∗ (s, t) + σF −1 (p2∗ (s, t)).
Moreover, ξ ∗ (s, t) and η ∗ (s, t) both converges to p1∗ (s, t) when σ → 0. Thus, for any
continuous belief of the fundamental held by the government, the ex-ante cost of the program
converges to 0 when σ → 0.
Now we want to show that it is possible to choose (s, t) such that 0 < p1∗ (s, t) < p2∗ (s, t) < 1
and p1∗ (s, t) can be arbitrarily close to 0. Let s = c − ε and
of t is feasible since Assumption 2.1b implies

c+c e −γb
1−γ

c+c e −γb
1−γ

< b. Note

c+c e −γb
1−γ

s
c −ε
<
,
e
γb + t(1 − γ) − c
c
c −s
ε
p1∗ (s, t) =
=
.
(1 − γ)(b − t)
(1 − γ)(b − t)
p2∗ (s, t) =
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< t < b. The choice
< t implies

Therefore, for any fixed t, when ε → 0, p1∗ (s, t) converges to 0 and p2∗ (s, t) converges to a
positive number which is strictly less than 1.

Proof of Proposition 2.7. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 2.1. We want to find
n
o∞
such that the strategies of group g agents survive n rounds of
a sequence (ξ gn , ξ¯ng )N
g =1
n=0

iterated deletion of dominated strategies only if

ag (x) = 0, if x < ξ gn ,

(2.39)

and ag (x) = 1, if x ≥ ξ¯ng .

(2.40)

¯
¯g N
To simplify notations, let ξ n = (ξ gn )N
g =1 and ξn = (ξn )g =1 be the vectors of threshold signals.
n
o∞
The recursive expression for (ξ gn , ξ¯ng )N
is
g =1
n=0

c
},
x
bg
c
= sup{x : p g (x; ξ¯n ) ≤ g }.
b
x

ξ gn+1 = inf {x : p g (x; ξ n ) ≥

(2.41)

g
ξ¯n+1

(2.42)

We can prove by induction that
−∞ = ξ 0 < ξ 1 ≤ · · · ≤ ξ n ≤ · · · ≤ ξ¯n ≤ · · · ≤ ξ¯1 < ξ¯0 = +∞.

(2.43)

Since any bounded monotonic sequence has a finite limit, take n to ∞, we have
ξ¯ ≥ ξ.

(2.44)

Now we want to show ξ¯ = ξ. It can be proved by contradiction. Suppose ξ¯ > ξ. Let h be

¯ is the solution to
the group such that ξ¯h − ξ h = maxg ξ¯g − ξ g > 0. Note that θ∗ (ξ)
N
X
g =1

 ¯g

ξ −θ
w m F
= θ.
σ
g

g

g
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(2.45)

¯ − (ξ¯h − ξ h ) is the solution to
Therefore, θ∗ (ξ)
N
X

w g mg F g

g =1

ξ¯g − (ξ¯h − ξ h ) − θ
σ

!
− θ − (ξ¯h − ξ h ) = 0.

(2.46)

− θ = 0.

(2.47)

Also notice θ∗ (ξ) is the solution to
N
X

g

g

w m F

g



g =1

ξg − θ
σ



Let’s compare (2.46) and (2.47). Since ξ g > ξ¯g − (ξ¯h − ξ h ) and ξ¯h − ξ h > 0, the left hand
side of (2.47) is strictly larger than the left hand side of (2.46) for any given θ. Given the
¯ − (ξ¯h − ξ h ) < θ∗ (ξ).
left hand side of (2.47) is strictly decreasing in θ, we must have θ∗ (ξ)
Therefore,
¯ =Pr h [θ > θ∗ (ξ)|
¯ ξ¯h ],
p h (ξ¯h ; ξ)

 ¯h
∗ ¯
h ξ − θ (ξ)
,
=F
σ
!
¯ − (ξ¯h − ξ h )]
ξ h − [θ∗ (ξ)
h
=F
,
σ
!
ξ h − θ∗ (θ∗ (ξ))
h
>F
,
σ
=p h (ξ h ; ξ).

¯ = p h (ξ h ; ξ) =
However. (2.41) and (2.42) implies p h (ξ¯h ; ξ)

c
.
bh

Contradiction. This implies

ξ¯ = ξ = ξ0 .
To solve for ξ0 , note ξ0 and θ0 are the solutions to
N
X

g

g

w m F

g

g =1

F

g



ξg − θ
σ


=

c
,
bg



ξg − θ
σ


= θ,

(2.48)

for any g = 1, ... , N.

(2.49)
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Plugging (2.49) into (2.48) we have
N
X

θ0 =

mg w g

g =1

ξ0g

=

N
X

mg w g

g =1

c
,
bg

c 
c
−1
+
σF
,
g
bg
bg

(2.50)

for any g = 1, ... , N.

(2.51)

Proof of Proposition 2.8. The optimal response of an agent in group g is
s
ai = 1, Reject, if p̂i ≥ ,
t
c −s
s
ai = 1, Accept, if g
≤ p̂i < ,
b −t
t
c −s
;
ai = 0, if p̂i < g
b −t
We can apply the same method in the proof of Proposition 2.7 and show that in any
equilibrium, agents of group g invest if and only if their private signal is greater or equal to

ξg∗ (s, t)

=

N
X
g =1

c −s
m w g
+ σFg−1
b −t
g

g



c −s
bg − t


.

(2.52)

Given the investment thresholds, we know the fundamental threshold above which there
will be successful investment is
∗

θ (s, t) =

N
X

mg w g

g =1

c −s
.
bg − t

(2.53)

Therefore, the signal η ∗ (s, t) that makes an agent from group g indifferent between accepting
and rejecting the intervention program is

η ∗ (s, t) =

N
X
g =1

mg w g

 
c −s
−1 s
+
σF
.
g
bg − t
t
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(2.54)

Proof of Proposition 2.9. Consider an agent who receives private signal x and knows
that all other agents invest if and only if observing private signal k. The expected payoff
from investing is
Z
U(k, x) =
θ

θ̄

1
f
σ



x −θ
σ

 


k −θ
π θ, 1 − F
dθ
σ

Note that U(k, x) weakly decreases in k and weakly increases in x. Intuitively, an agent
has higher expected payoff if everyone else is more willing to invest or the agent receives a
high signal indicating a high fundamental θ. Also note that U(−∞, x) < 0 for x < θ0 and
U(+∞, x) > 0 for x > θ1 .
Next we prove the uniqueness of equilibrium by iterated deletion of dominated strategies.
The strategy profile of an agent is the action as a function of the private signal received.
We denote it by a(x) : R → {0, 1}. We will prove that strategy survives n rounds of iterated
deletion of dominated strategies if and only if

where

a(x) = 0, if x < ξ n ,

(2.55)

and a(x) = 1, if x ≥ ξ¯n .

(2.56)

−∞ = ξ 0 < ξ 1 ≤ · · · ≤ ξ n ≤ · · · ≤ ξ¯n ≤ · · · ≤ ξ¯1 < ξ¯0 = +∞.

(2.57)

n
o∞
(ξ n , ξ¯n )

n=0

satisfies

This result can be proved by induction. Let the starting node be ξ 0 = −∞ and ξ¯0 = +∞,
meaning that there is no restrictions on agents’ strategy. Suppose round n ∈ N of deletion
has been completed. In round n + 1, the most optimistic belief for an agent is that all
other agents follow a cutoff strategy with threshold ξ n . Therefore, for any x such that
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U(ξ n , x) < 0, a(x) = 1 is strictly dominated by a(x) = 0. Similarly, the most pessimistic
belief for an agent is that all other agents follow a cutoff strategy with threshold ξ¯n . As a
result, for x such that U(ξ¯n , x) > 0, any strategy profile with a(x) = 0 is strictly dominated
by a(x) = 1.
Given U(k, x) is non-decreasing in x, the strategy profiles that survives deletion of dominated strategies must satisfy the restrictions in (2.55) and (2.56), with (ξ n+1 , ξ¯n+1 ) defined
inductively as

ξ n+1 = inf{x : U(ξ n , x) ≥ 0}

(2.58)

ξ¯n+1 = sup{x : U(ξ¯n , x) ≤ 0}

(2.59)

and

The monotonicity of U(k, x) guarantees that ξ n+1 ≤ ξ¯n+1 . Note that the dominance region
n
o∞
assumption implies that ξ 1 > −∞ and ξ¯1 < +∞. Therefore, (ξ n , ξ¯n )
is a well-defined
n=0

sequence of real couples which satisfies (2.57).
¯ ∞
Now we’ve proved that {ξ n }∞
n=1 and {ξn }n=1 are both monotonic and bounded sequences.
Thus, they converges to two finite numbers ξ and ξ¯ respectively when n → ∞. The definition
¯ ξ)
¯ ≤ 0. Notice for y ∈ [θ0 , θ1 ],
(2.58) and (2.59) imply that U(ξ, ξ) ≥ 0 and U(ξ,
Z
U(y , y ) =
θ

θ̄

1
f
σ



y −θ
σ

 


Z 1
y −θ
π y, 1 − F
dθ =
π (y , l) dl,
σ
0

¯ it must be the case that U(ξ, ξ) = U(ξ,
¯ ξ)
¯ = 0.
strictly increases in y and ξ ≤ ξ,
Since U(y , y ) is continuous in y , U(θ, θ) ≤ 0, U(θ̄, θ̄) ≥ 0, there is a unique solution to
R1
U(y , y ) = 0 π (y , l) dl = 0. Denote the solution by ξ0∗ , and we have ξ = ξ¯ = ξ0∗ . Therefore,
the only strategy that survives the iterated deletion of dominated strategies is the cutoff
investment strategy with cutoff ξ0∗ .
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Proof of Proposition 2.10. Consider an agent who receives private signal x and knows
that all other agents invest if and only if their signal is above k. The expected payoff from
investing and rejecting the intervention offer is

R

Z

U (k, x) =
θ

θ̄

1
f
σ



x −θ
σ

 


k −θ
π θ, 1 − F
dθ.
σ

The expected payoff from investing and accepting the offer is

U A (k, x) = (1 − t)U R (k, x) + s

Therefore, the maximum expected payoff from investing is

U(k, x) = max{U R (k, x), U A (k, x)}

We prove a lemma that will be useful later.

Lemma 2.2. Given that all other agents invest if and only if their signal is above k, there
exist two functions k1∗ (k) and k2∗ (k) such that an agent strictly prefers not investing if her
private signal x < k1∗ (k) and strictly prefers investing if x > k2∗ (k). k1∗ (k) and k2∗ (k) are
given by



s
= inf k : U (k, k ) ≥ −
,
1−t


s
,
k2∗ (k) = sup k ∗ : U R (k, k ∗ ) ≤ −
1−t
k1∗ (k)

∗

R

∗

Both k1∗ (k) and k2∗ (k) are weakly increasing in k.
Proof of Lemma 2.2. The Left Dominance Region assumption in Definition 2.1 and Limit
Dominance in Assumption 2.3 make sure that the two function k1∗ (k) and k2∗ (k) are well
defined. By continuity of U R (k, x) in x, we have
U R (k, k1∗ (k)) = U R (k, k2∗ (k)) = −
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s
,
1−t

s
, U A (k, x) = (1 − t)U R (k, x) + s < 0. Therefore,
For any x < k1∗ (k), U R (k, x) < − 1−t

U(k, x) = max{U R (k, x), U A (k, x)} < 0, the agent will not invest if observing x < k1∗ (k).
s
On the other hand, for any x > k2∗ (k), U R (k, x) > − 1−t
, U A (k, x) = (1 − t)U R (k, x) + s > 0.

Therefore, U(k, x) = max{U R (k, x), U A (k, x)} > 0, the agent will invest after observing
signal x > k2∗ (k).
Since U R (k, x) is weakly decreasing in k, we can easily show that both k1∗ (k) and k2∗ (k) are
weakly increasing in k.

With Lemma 2.2, we can prove the uniqueness of equilibrium by iterated deletion of dominated strategies. Denote the investment strategy by a(x). We want to show a strategy
survives n rounds of iterated deletion of dominated strategies if and only if

a(x) =



 0, if x < ξ ,
n

 1, if x > ξ¯n ,

where ξ 0 = −∞, ξ¯0 = ∞. ξ n and ξ¯n are defined inductively by ξ n+1 = k1∗ (ξ n ), ξ¯n+1 = k2∗ (ξ¯n ).
Since k ∗ (ξ) increases in ξ, ξ n and ξ¯n are increasing and decreasing sequences, respectively.
¯ Therefore, ξ = k ∗ (ξ) and ξ¯ = k ∗ (ξ).
¯ ξ and ξ¯ must both be
As n → ∞, ξ n → ξ and ξ¯n → ξ.
1
2
the solution to

U R (ξ, ξ) = −

Let l = 1 − F



ξ−θ
σ



s
.
1−t

, the equation can be written as
Z

1

π (ξ, l) dl = −
0

s
1−t

(2.60)

By Strict Laplacian State Monotonicity in Assumption 2.3, the left hand side is continuous

R1
R1
s
s
and strictly increasing in ξ. Also, 0 π (θ, l) dl < − 1−t
, 0 π θ̄, l dl > 0 ≥ − 1−t
, there is a
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unique solution to the equation above, ξ = ξ¯ = ξ ∗ . Notice ξ ∗ is independent of σ. Then by
iterated deletion of dominated strategies, it is the unique investment cutoff in equilibrium.
Given the investment cutoff, we can solve for the private signal x such that U A (ξ ∗ , x) =
U R (ξ ∗ , x), or equivalently U R (ξ ∗ , η ∗ (σ)) = st . Let η ∗ (σ) be the maximum value that satisfies
U R (ξ ∗ , η ∗ ) =

Z
θ

θ̄

1
f
σ



η∗ − θ
σ

 
 ∗

ξ −θ
s
π η∗, 1 − F
dθ = .
σ
t

(2.61)

For any signal x > η ∗ (σ), an agent strictly prefers investing and not participating in the
intervention program. Notice when x > ξ ∗ + σ, U R (ξ ∗ , x) = π(x, 1) > st , therefore, η ∗ (σ) is
well-defined.
s
≤
Since U R (k, x) increases in x, and U R (ξ ∗ , ξ ∗ ) = − 1−t

s
t

= U R (ξ ∗ , η ∗ (σ)), therefore,

η ∗ (σ) ≥ ξ ∗ . It immediately follows that limσ→0 η ∗ (σ) = η ≥ ξ ∗ . Next, we prove η = ξ ∗ by
contradiction. Suppose η > ξ ∗ , take σ → 0 in the left hand side of (2.61), we have
Z
lim

σ→0 θ

θ̄

1
f
σ



η ∗ (σ) − θ
σ

 
 ∗

ξ −θ
s
∗
π η (σ), 1 − F
dθ = π (η, 1) ≥ π(ξ ∗ , 1) >
σ
t

Contradiction to (2.61). Therefore, lim η ∗ (σ) = η = ξ ∗ .
σ→0

Proof of Proposition 2.11. According to Definition 2.1, a partial-participation program
with target ξ ∗ should satisfy the following conditions
s
1. π(θ, 1) < − 1−t

2. π(ξ ∗ , 1) >
3.

R1
0

s
t

s
π(ξ ∗ , l)dl = − 1−t

As long as the government offers (s, t) given by
!−1

π(ξ ∗ , 1)

−R 1
0

π(ξ ∗ , l)dl

+1
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< t < 1,

(2.62)

and
Z
s = −(1 − t)

1

π(ξ ∗ , l)dl,

(2.63)

0

R1
the three conditions listed above are satisfied. First, by assumption, π(θ, 1) ≤ 0 π(θ0 , l)dl <
R1
R
s
1−t 1
s
∗
∗
∗
0 π(ξ , l)dl = − 1−t . Second, (2.62) can be written as π(ξ , 1) > − t
0 π(ξ , l)dl = t .
Finally, the third condition directly follows equation (2.63).
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